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Abstract The Constitution Act of 1919 was replaced in 2000 by a new
Constitution, which was amended in 2012. While the institution of exceptive
enactments, which enables the adoption of laws that are in conflict with the
Constitution, had earlier assumed a key role in constitutional adjustment for EU
integration, the 2012 amendments expressed a constitutional commitment to EU
membership and provided for the transfer of powers to the EU. As a result,
exceptive enactments are no longer needed for such transfer. Instead of a consti-
tutional court, a key role in constitutional review is played by the Constitutional
Law Committee of Parliament through ex ante review of legislative proposals or
other matters pending before Parliament, including proposals for EU legislation, for
their compatibility with the Constitution and Finland’s international human rights
obligations. From the late 1980s onwards, the constitutional tendency has
increasingly been towards rights-based judicial review. Aside from the ECHR and
other human rights treaties, EU membership has greatly contributed to both judicial
empowerment and enhanced rights protection. Areas where EU law has presented
constitutional challenges include: (a) the European Arrest Warrant, with regard to
which Finland introduced constitutional and legislative safeguards for the sake of
fundamental rights; (b) the Laval and Viking Line stream of case law; and
(c) concerns around preserving ‘the quality of law’ when implementing EU law. In
result of the ex ante constitutional review of the draft ESM Treaty, a change in the
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draft treaty stemming from constitutional concerns about increased ﬁnancial lia-
bilities without parliamentary control was proposed and achieved.
Keywords The Constitution of Finland of 2000  The 2012 amendment of the
Constitution in relation to EU and international co-operation  Ex ante constitu-
tional review by the Constitutional Committee of Parliament  Fundamental rights
and the rule of law  Rise of rights-based judicial review  Constitutional and
legislative safeguards with regard to the European Arrest Warrant and extraditions
Data Retention Directive  Laval, Viking Line, posted workers and collective action
Quality of law  Parliamentary reservation of law when implementing EU and
international measures  ESM Treaty and maximum ﬁnancial liabilities
Article 53 EU Charter and the question of a higher standard of protection
1 Constitutional Amendments Regarding EU Membership
1.1 Introduction: Some Characteristics of the Finnish
Constitutional System and Culture
1.1.1–1.1.2 The Constitution, as a legal and political instrument, has traditionally
been highly esteemed in Finland. The origins of great respect for constitutional
enactments can be traced as far back as the legal-positivist resistance by the Finnish
legal and political elite to the campaigns of ‘Russiﬁcation’ between 1899 and 1905.
Over a century, from 1809 to 1917, Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy
within the Russian Empire and thus had its own legal system, including constitu-
tional enactments inherited from the era of Swedish rule (before 1809). During the
years of ‘Russiﬁcation’, however, Finns fought against arbitrary Russian interfer-
ences in Finland’s domestic legal and political affairs by advancing a constitutional
challenge, essentially founded on a simple, yet ﬁrm claim that all authorities,
including those of the Russian Empire, had to strictly observe Finland’s constitu-
tional enactments and Finnish law in general in the exercise of their powers. As this
constitutional challenge also proved very successful, a strong tradition of legalism,
including respect for the rule of law, began to characterise Finnish constitutionalism
from those years onwards.1
The current Constitution of Finland (Act No. 731/1999)2 entered into force on 1
March 2000, and replaced the earlier Constitution Act of 1919 and three other
1 See in more detail Ojanen 2007, pp. 146–148. See about the Finnish understanding of the
Constitution and the legacy of autonomy under the Russian Empire, also Mutanen 2015, pp. 272–
276 with references.
2 All translations are from the unofﬁcial translation of the Constitution of Finland, including
amendments up to 1112/2011, in English available at: https://www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ/ﬁ/laki/kaannokset/
1999/en19990731.pdf.
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enactments enjoying constitutional status.3 The Constitution of Finland is a modern
and uniﬁed constitutional document with a concise and uniform style. Aside from
including some new elements and codifying certain practices and doctrines, the
Constitution of Finland incorporates a number of principles, structures and solu-
tions that were already established in earlier constitutional documents. As with
earlier constitutional enactments, the Constitution can be understood as enjoying
strong legitimacy across the whole sweep of the Finnish political system and
society, as Parliament adopted the Constitution almost unanimously, with a ﬁnal
vote of 175 for and only 2 against.
For the practical and theoretical purposes of this paper, the following two
peculiarities of the Finnish constitutional system are particularly worthy of elabo-
ration. The ﬁrst constitutional idiosyncrasy is the structural framework of the
Finnish model of constitutional review. It still primarily assumes the nature of
(abstract) ex ante review by the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament of
legislative proposals and other matters brought for its consideration for their rela-
tion to the Constitution and international human rights treaties.4,5 By contrast,
Finland has always lacked a distinct constitutional court. Moreover, there was a
rigid prohibition of judicial review of Acts of Parliament for their compatibility
with the Constitution until the entry into force of the current Constitution of Finland
in 2000. Although Sect. 1066 of the Constitution now empowers courts to give
primacy to the Constitution if the application of an Act of Parliament would be in
‘manifest conflict’ with the Constitution, Sect. 106 amounts to a form of weak
judicial review that combines the abstract ex ante constitutional review of legis-
lation by the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament with the concrete ex post
judicial review by the courts. In this model, the ex ante constitutional review by the
Constitutional Law Committee is still supposed to remain the primary form of
review, whereas judicial review under Sect. 106 is designed to plug loopholes left in
the abstract ex ante review of the constitutionality of government bills, inasmuch as
unforeseen constitutional problems might arise in applying the law by the courts in
particular cases.
The main difference in comparison with constitutional courts is, of course, that in
the Finnish model the power of review is held by a primarily political organ
3 Accordingly, there were four constitutional enactments enjoying constitutional status: the
Constitution Act of Finland, the Parliament Act and two Acts on ministerial liability. All Acts were
passed during the ﬁrst years of independence (the Acts of 94/1919; 7/1928; 274/1922; and 273/
1922).
4 Section 74 of the Constitution, entitled ‘Supervision of constitutionality’, provides as follows:
‘The Constitutional Law Committee shall issue statements on the constitutionality of legislative
proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as well as on their relation to interna-
tional human rights treaties.’
5 For the Finnish system of constitutional review, see Lavapuro et al. 2011, pp. 505–531.
6 Section 106 of the 2000 Constitution, entitled ‘The Primacy of the Constitution’, provides as
follows: ‘If in a matter being tried by a court, the application of an Act of Parliament would be in
manifest conflict with the Constitution, the court of law shall give primacy to the provision in the
Constitution.’ For the background of Sect. 106, see Ojanen 2009a.
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composed of Members of Parliament and acting as an integral part in the political
process of legislative action. A cautionary note for those readers who believe that
the political organisation of constitutional review automatically results in a
non-legalistic and morally deep deliberation of rights issues. Despite its political
organisation, the practice of the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee is charac-
terised by formalistic argumentation and a search for interpretations that can be
directly linked to the text of the Constitution or its preparatory works as well as to
its own precedents. Moreover, before issuing its Opinions or Reports, the
Committee regularly hears experts in constitutional law, notably university pro-
fessors, whose opinions have signiﬁcant impact on the Committee’s interpretive
framework. While not formally legally binding, the statements by the Committee on
the harmony or discrepancy of a bill with the Constitution are generally treated as
authoritative. It is quite usual for the Committee to ﬁnd a bill to be unconstitutional
in one or more respects and, accordingly, require amendments to be made to the bill
during its parliamentary consideration.
Given that the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament assumes a role
similar to the usual role of a constitutional court in centralised forms of constitu-
tional review, the practice of the Committee will be of great signiﬁcance for the
purposes of this report.
The second traditional distinction, even quirk, of the Finnish constitutional
system is the institution of exceptive enactments.7 The origins of this institution can
be traced as far back as the era of the Grand Duchy of Finland in the Russian
Empire between 1809 and 1917. In essence, this institution makes it possible to
adopt laws that in substance conflict with the Constitution without amending the
text thereof, subject to the proviso, however, that such exceptive enactments be
approved in accordance with the procedure for constitutional enactments.
Traditionally, constitutional lawyers speak about making a ‘hole’ in the
Constitution by an exceptive enactment and ﬁlling it with the relevant norms of the
exceptive enactment.
While the importance of the institution of exceptive enactments has gradually
decreased since the late 1980s and the Constitution of Finland now also imposes
limits to derogations from the Constitution by means of exceptive enactments, the
institution of exceptive enactments has assumed a signiﬁcant role in the context of
EU membership, as will be discussed in more detail below in Sect. 1.2.1.
The third most signiﬁcant characteristic of the contemporary constitutional
system, including constitutional culture, relates to the domestic system of the
protection of fundamental and human rights. Up until the late 1980s, fundamental
and human rights, as well as their judicial safeguards, assumed a marginal role on
the Finnish scene of constitutionalism. As the Finnish Constitution subscribed to
the French Revolutionary conception of the law as a supreme expression of the
7 A brief historical review of this institution in English is provided in Scheinin 2002, pp. 55 and
56.
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people’s will as well as to ideas about democracy as majority rule,8 the outcome
was a rigid prohibition of judicial review and a marginal role for individual rights,
although the Finnish Constitution has included a distinct catalogue of constitutional
rights ever since the entry into force of the Constitution Act of 1919.
Since the late 1980s, however, tendencies of Europeanisation, rights-based
judicial review and the rise of international organisations and global institutions
with their regulatory networks have entailed that fundamental rights and human
rights treaties binding on Finland have started to play a greater role in the courts and
the Finnish scene of constitutionalism in general.9 In particular, Finland’s accession
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1989 and the incorpo-
ration of its provisions into the domestic legal order in 1990 represents one of the
most important turns in Finnish constitutional history.10 Human rights treaties
binding on Finland, with the ECHR at their apex, provided the main inspiration and
stimulus for a comprehensive reform of the domestic system for the protection of
constitutional rights, which entered into force on 1 August 1995. As a result of the
reform, the current fundamental rights catalogue in the 1999 Constitution of Finland
(Chap. 2 of the Constitution) is very comprehensive, setting out a range of eco-
nomic, social, cultural and ‘third-generation’ rights alongside more traditional civil
and political rights.11 Moreover, these transformations of the Finnish constitutional
system and culture regarding fundamental and human rights have been accompa-
nied by a tendency towards stronger judicial safeguards for rights protection,
although the growing role of the judiciary also owes to such tendencies of modern
law as an overflow of legislation and open-ended framework legislation that pass
important decision-making power to the level of concrete cases. In addition, EU
membership has greatly contributed to a shift of competence to the judiciary.
1.2 The Amendment of the Constitution of Finland
in Relation to the European Union
1.2.1 European Union related amendments On the threshold of EU member-
ship, the Constitution assumed a very minimalist approach to integration and
internationalisation in general. The Constitution was very introverted and
domestic-oriented.12 The Constitution lacked a constitutional provision permitting
limitations of sovereignty or the transfer of powers to international organisations,
not to speak of the EU in particular.
8 See Nergelius 2006.
9 Lavapuro et al. 2011.
10 See also Viljanen 1996.
11 See also Salminen 2014, pp. 41–63, and Ojanen 2013, pp. 93–113.
12 Ojanen 2013, p. 110.
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Due to the availability of the institution of exceptive enactments, no amendment
of the Constitution was found necessary to enable Finland to join the EU despite the
fact that the Accession Treaty was deemed to be in conflict with the Constitution,
with the major reason simply being the incompatibility of the Accession Treaty
with the sovereignty of Finland.13 Accordingly, the Treaty of Accession was
incorporated into Finnish law through an exceptive enactment (Act No. 1540 of
1994), approved by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
However, some changes in the Constitution Act of 1919 were found necessary;
the relevant amendments concerned the domestic distribution of powers between
the Government and the President, and the role of Parliament in EU affairs.14 The
accession of Finland to the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 and to the EU
in 1995 had already increased pressure to reconsider the domestic distribution of
powers between Parliament, the Government and the President. Although the
powers of the President had already been reduced in domestic affairs, the President
still enjoyed strong powers in the sphere of foreign affairs in the early 1990s. Thus,
one of the most important issues to be decided in Finland prior to embarking on the
process of European integration was whether European affairs – ﬁrst EEA affairs
and later EU affairs – should be considered as domestic or foreign policy matters. In
the latter case, they would have fallen within the competence of the President by
virtue of Sect. 33 of the Constitution Act of 1919, with the outcome that the
constitutional pendulum would have lurched back again towards a strong presi-
dency, thereby watering down constitutional amendments since the early 1980s that
nudged the Finnish constitutional system towards parliamentarism. In particular,
this outcome would have meant a severe blow to the participation of Parliament in
EU affairs.
However, the competences were arranged according to the same ratio used in
domestic legislative affairs, instead of the typical competence arrangements for
foreign policy. Accordingly, the Constitution was amended so that the main
responsibility for the national preparation of EEA affairs and later EU affairs was
given to the Government, whose members are individually and collectively
accountable to Parliament. This was important because the line of development had
since the mid-1980s begun to move towards parliamentarism from the previous
strong powers of the President, and EU membership and these arrangements gave
support to this tendency. EU membership resulted in a horizontal relocation of
authority between Parliament, the Government and the President, and contributed to
an enhancement of the parliamentary features of the Finnish constitutional-political
system. In addition, speciﬁc constitutional provisions were enacted for the purpose
of ensuring the participation of Parliament in considering EU affairs, which would,
13 See Opinion 14/1994 of the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament.
14 See also Ojanen 2004, pp. 536–538 and 551–554. See generally Salminen 2015, discussing the
changes as transformations of the integration norms of the Finnish Constitution. See also Mutanen
2015, discussing the changes in the concept of sovereignty in Finland from a comparative per-
spective. Mutanen 2015 provides a detailed account of the amendment process, drafting history
and relevant literature in English.
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according to the Constitution, otherwise fall within the competence of Parliament.
In the same wave, Parliament was also given strong rights for receiving information
in EU affairs.15
In the Finnish context the experiences of this system – the allocation of powers
and the strong participation and information rights of Parliament – were considered
to be so valuable that the same provisions were adopted in the Constitution of 2000.
Section 96
The Parliament considers those proposals for acts, agreements and other measures which
are to be decided in the European Union and which otherwise, according to the
Constitution, would fall within the competence of the Parliament.
The Government shall, for the determination of the position of the Parliament, communi-
cate a proposal referred to in paragraph (1) to the Parliament by a communication of the
Government, without delay, after receiving notice of the proposal. The proposal is con-
sidered in the Grand Committee and ordinarily in one or more of the other Committees that
issue statements to the Grand Committee. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee con-
siders a proposal pertaining to foreign and security policy. Where necessary, the Grand
Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee may issue to the Government a statement on
the proposal. In addition, the Speaker’s Council may decide that the matter be taken up for
debate in plenary session, during which, however, no decision is made by the Parliament.
The Government shall provide the appropriate Committees with information on the con-
sideration of the matter in the European Union. The Grand Committee or the Foreign
Affairs Committee shall also be informed of the position of the Government on the matter.
Section 97
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament shall receive from the Government, upon
request and when otherwise necessary, reports of matters pertaining to foreign and security
policy. Correspondingly, the Grand Committee of the Parliament shall receive reports on
the preparation of other matters in the European Union. The Speaker’s Council may decide
on a report being taken up for debate in plenary session, during which, however, no
decision is made by the Parliament.
The Prime Minister shall provide the Parliament or a Committee with information on
matters to be dealt with in a European Council beforehand and without delay after a
meeting of the Council. The same applies when amendments are being prepared to the
treaties establishing the European Union.
The appropriate Committee of the Parliament may issue a statement to the Government on
the basis of the reports or information referred to above.
Powers are distributed between the Government and the President such that
Government clearly has the general competence for EU affairs. According to
Sect. 93(2)
[t]he Government is responsible for the national preparation of the decisions to be made in
the European Union, and decides on the concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision
requires the approval of the Parliament. The Parliament participates in the national
preparation of decisions to be made in the European Union, as provided in this
Constitution.
15 See also Ojanen 2004, pp. 554–557, and Viljanen 2003.
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Further, the Constitution of Finland of 2000, which of course was enacted when
Finland was an EU member and as such was designed to function as a constitution
of a Member State,16 tried to codify the new doctrinal transitions which had
occurred in the understanding of Finnish sovereignty by including a so-called
internationalisation principle (Sect. 1(3)) according to which
Finland participates in international co-operation for the protection of peace and human
rights and for the development of society.
According to the travaux préparatoires, this provision functions to offer a new
dimension for the construction of sovereignty so that those international obligations
which are deemed to be ‘conventional’ in modern international co-operation and
which only affect sovereignty in a ‘minor way’ will no longer be deemed to conflict
with the sovereignty of Finland. Moreover, the sovereignty doctrine is based on the
idea of the speciﬁcity of the EU, with greater tolerance of the limitations on
sovereignty stemming from EU membership than those derived from other inter-
national obligations. In particular, the part of the section referring to the ‘devel-
opment of society’ was meant to denote EU membership.
Nevertheless, membership in the EU was not very visible in the Constitution.
Yet one can also not claim that membership was not explicitly reflected in the
wording of the Constitution because the provisions on division of powers between
state organs included sections on the EU. From the very start of Finland’s EU
membership, there has been debate over the question to what extent, if any, EU
membership should be recognised in the text of the Constitution. Even the entry
into force of the Constitution of Finland in 2000 failed to answer this question in a
satisfactory way, as it did not contain any explicit references to the EU. The most
problematic issue was, however, that the Constitution lacked a solid way of
transferring the powers of the state. Upon incorporating the Constitutional Treaty
and Lisbon Treaty into Finnish law it became obvious that the transfers could no
longer be based on exceptive enactments. Moreover, the fact that EU membership
was not clearly stated as part of the fundamental organisation of Finland was
considered problematic.17
Thus, when the Constitution and its functioning were evaluated and amended
after having been in force for ten years, these issues were revisited in a new light.
After the amendments of 2012, the Constitution now reflects the constitutional
orientation towards international cooperation for societal development through the
EU and expresses commitment to EU membership. In a way, the infancy of EU
membership is now over and the Constitution has grown up to be able to face the
EU. This new approach can also be observed in new provisions explicitly providing
that a signiﬁcant transfer of state powers to the EU or an international organisation
requires a decision made by at least two-thirds of the votes cast in Parliament. This
also means that transfers of ‘insigniﬁcant’ powers can be decided by simple
16 See Salminen 2014.
17 Salminen 2010a, pp. 509–527.
366 T. Ojanen and J. Salminen
majority. Whereas EU membership was brought into force internally by the use of
the institution of exceptive enactments allowing for the adoption of legislation
conflicting with the Constitution and thus placing membership principally outside
the Constitution as a conflicting phenomenon, the current Constitution expresses a
constitutional commitment towards the Union and provides a speciﬁc provision for
the transfer of powers to the Union. Now, only a signiﬁcant transfer of powers to
the EU requires a qualiﬁed majority, and the application of the institution of
exceptive enactments is no longer needed for such transfer. The domestic debate
over the competence of the President to represent Finland in the European Council
also needed some clariﬁcation. The ﬁnishing touch was added after the Lisbon
Treaty had already entered into force with a new provision explicitly providing that
the Prime Minister represents Finland in the European Council. In addition, an
amendment was made in the domestic catalogue of fundamental rights due to EU
membership by adding the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament to
the participatory rights of the citizen.
After these changes, Sect. 1(3) of the Constitution provides as follows:
Finland participates in international co-operation for the protection of peace and human
rights and for the development of society. Finland is a Member State of the European
Union (emphasis added, 1112/2011, entry into force 1.3.2012).
Currently, Sect. 94 on the acceptance of international obligations and their
denouncement and Sect. 95 on the entry into force of international obligations
include the possibility for the transfer of the powers according to the constitutional
system and provide a decision making procedure for this purpose:
Section 94
The acceptance of the Parliament is required for such treaties and other international
obligations that contain provisions of a legislative nature, are otherwise signiﬁcant, or
otherwise require approval by the Parliament under this Constitution. The acceptance of the
Parliament is required also for the denouncement of such obligations.
A decision concerning the acceptance of an international obligation or the denouncement of
it is made by a majority of the votes cast. However, if the proposal concerns the
Constitution or an alteration of the national borders, or such transfer of authority to the
European Union, an international organisation or an international body that is of signiﬁ-
cance with regard to Finland’s sovereignty, the decision shall be made by at least two thirds
of the votes cast. (1112/2011, entry into force 1.3.2012)
An international obligation shall not endanger the democratic foundations of the
Constitution.
Section 95
The provisions of treaties and other international obligations, in so far as they are of a
legislative nature, are brought into force by an Act. Otherwise, international obligations are
brought into force by a Decree. (1112/2011, entry into force 1.3.2012)
A Government bill for the bringing into force of an international obligation is considered in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure pertaining to an Act. However, if the
proposal concerns the Constitution or a change to the national territory, or such transfer of
authority to the European Union, an international organisation or an international body that
is of signiﬁcance with regard to Finland’s sovereignty, the Parliament shall adopt it, without
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leaving it in abeyance, by a decision supported by at least two thirds of the votes cast.
(1112/2011, entry into force 1.3.2012)
An Act may state that for the bringing into force of an international obligation its entry into
force is provided by a Decree. General provisions on the publication of treaties and other
international obligations are laid down by an Act.
Reflecting the multilevel setting and the status of the citizens as citizens of the
Union as well, Sect. 14(2) on participatory rights now states:
Every Finnish citizen and every other citizen of the European Union resident in Finland,
having attained eighteen years of age, has the right to vote in the European Parliamentary
elections, as provided by an Act.
Considering the changes in the Constitution which had resulted from member-
ship in the EU but which did not mention this context in the text, Sect. 9(3) on the
freedom of movement was amended in 2007 after it had previously been altered
through an exceptive enactment when the European Arrest Warrant was brought
into force in Finland (see Sect. 2.3).18
Furthermore, EU law also shaped the reform of the domestic system for the
protection of fundamental rights in the mid-1990s. At the time, a relatively wide-
spread concern was that EU membership might somehow dilute the domestic
standard of rights protection.19 (See the more detailed discussion in Sect. 2.1.1).
1.2.2 The procedure of constitutional amendment The procedure for constitu-
tional enactments has remained unchanged since the entry into force of the
Constitution Act of 1919. Currently, Sect. 73 of the Constitution provides as
follows:
A proposal on the enactment, amendment or repeal of the Constitution or on the enactment
of a limited derogation of the Constitution shall in the second reading be left in abeyance,
by a majority of the votes cast, until the ﬁrst parliamentary session following parliamentary
elections. The proposal shall then, once the Committee has issued its report, be adopted
without material alterations in one reading in a plenary session by a decision supported by
at least two thirds of the votes cast. However, the proposal may be declared urgent by a
decision that has been supported by at least ﬁve sixths of the votes cast. In this event, the
proposal is not left in abeyance and it can be adopted by a decision supported by at least
two thirds of the votes cast.
Thus, the normal constitutional amendment procedure requires leaving the bill in
abeyance after an election. This may only be avoided in a case of urgency and if the
decision on urgency is supported by at least ﬁve-sixths of the votes cast. In normal
cases, which are also most frequent in practice, an amendment can be assessed by
the electorate due to its being held in abeyance until after the next elections.
However, in this context one has to consider the most peculiar thing in the
Finnish legal system, the institution of exceptive enactments. As explained above,
18 See discussion in Ojanen 2006, pp. 89–100, and from the point of view of amending the
Constitution, Salminen 2010b, pp. 161–177, and Viljanen 2009, pp. 57–88.
19 See for example discussion in Ojanen 2004, pp. 541–544.
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the institution has its roots in the era when Finland was a Grand Duchy in the
Russian Empire. While the Finns, in the legal positivist spirit, urged the Russians to
abide by Finland’s constitutional enactments that originated in the period of
Swedish rule, there was an acute need for modern legislation, and the institution of
exceptive enactments was invented to circumvent deadlocks in situations where
there was no wish to amend the Constitution formally. Basically, an exceptive
enactment enables the adoption of legislation that in substance conflicts with the
Constitution without amending the text thereof, subject to the proviso that such
legislation be approved in accordance with the procedure for constitutional enact-
ments. A ‘hole’ in the Constitution is made by an exceptive enactment and ﬁlled
with the relevant norms of the exceptive enactment. In recent decades, the insti-
tution of exceptive enactments has often been used for the purpose of bringing
international treaties that conflict with the Constitution into force. Exceptive
enactments relating to international treaties can also be enacted through a less
arduous procedure than other exceptive enactments, as a two-thirds majority of the
votes cast in Parliament sufﬁces for bringing into force international obligations that
conflict with the Constitution. By contrast, exceptive enactments in purely domestic
matters are enacted through a procedure for constitutional enactments that requires
that the bill be left in abeyance until after an election, provided that the bill is not
declared urgent by a decision made by at least ﬁve-sixths of the votes cast. In
addition, the bill must be adopted by a decision supported by at least two-thirds of
the votes cast (Sect. 73 of the current Constitution).20
1.2.3 The background to EU amendments As an example of the exceptive
amendments, the 1994 Treaty of Accession of Finland to the EU was deemed to be
in conflict with the Constitution, mainly because of incompatibility between
Finland’s sovereignty and the transfer of powers to the EU. However, instead of
amending the Constitution, the Treaty of Accession was incorporated into Finnish
law through an exceptive enactment approved by a two-thirds majority in
Parliament. The same procedure was applied to incorporate the Treaty of
Amsterdam, the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty into Finnish law. As
the Nice Treaty was not considered to be in conflict with the Constitution, its
incorporation was approved by simple majority.
When the Constitution of 2000 was enacted, there was not enough political will
to express EU membership in the text of the Constitution in a clearer manner at that
stage. This minimalistic approach was probably also a result of Finland not having
been a Member State for a longer period. Additionally, in the context of incorpo-
rating the treaties into the Finnish legal system, the institution of exceptive enact-
ments was considered a useful procedure. However, the ﬁrst steps in the waning of
this particular institution were taken already at this stage. Limitations to the usage
of exceptive enactments were enacted and developed in legal research in particu-
lar.21 Contrary to the previous situation, in discussions surrounding the recent
20 See generally Ojanen 2013, pp. 104–106, and Suksi 2011, pp. 101–105.
21 See especially Viljanen 1999.
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amendment, emphasis was put on the correctness of the Constitution. It was
underlined that the Constitution should in principle give a clear and accurate picture
of the constitutional reality. If a great amount of public power that is relevant to
Finland and in Finland, both with regard to state organs and individuals, is exer-
cised in the context of the EU, this should be reflected in the text of the Constitution
as well. There was a need to be more transparent and open on this question. The
Constitution might otherwise risk losing its relevance as lex fundamentalis.22
The reform of 2012 included several EU motivated issues. Most importantly, a
new procedure for transfers of power was introduced. This was from the beginning
built on the dynamic idea of transferring powers and also explicitly mentioning the
EU in this provision, because the majority of transferred powers relate to mem-
bership in the Union. As usual in Finland, when amending the Constitution, the
changes were explained as being mostly a codiﬁcation of the state practice and
interpretations that already existed. Thus, the amendments were motivated mainly
by a desire to make EU membership visible in the text of the Constitution. The idea
not the change the fundamentals of the membership was underlined. Nevertheless,
the new procedure for the transfer of powers to the EU in principle signiﬁed a very
important change in the very elementary features of membership.23 Additionally,
the explicit mention of Union membership among the fundamentals of the Finnish
Constitution in its ﬁrst Chapter clearly shows commitment towards Union mem-
bership and binds the Finnish Constitution with European integration.
The recent reforms were greatly supported by legal scholars, and the advice of
scholars was followed.24
1.2.4 Although there are some inconsistencies in the Constitution now that EU
affairs have been placed among international affairs in the system of the
Constitution, there are currently no calls for amending the Constitution because of
any issue relating to membership in the EU.
1.3 Conceptualising Sovereignty and the Limits
to the Transfer of Powers
1.3.1 The new provisions of the Constitution of Finland explicitly provide that a
signiﬁcant transfer of state powers to the EU or an international organisation
requires a two-thirds majority of votes cast in Parliament (Sect. 94(2) and Sect. 95
(2)). This also means that transfers of ‘insigniﬁcant’ powers can be decided by
simple majority. Whereas Union membership was brought into force internally by
the use of the institution of exceptive enactments that allows for the adoption of
22 See Salminen 2010b, pp. 161–177.
23 See Salminen 2015.
24 See for example the articles Salminen 2010a, b and Salminen 2009, pp. 269–283 and compare
with the amendments. The result seems to follow the suggested lines of the revision.
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legislation that conflicts with the Constitution and thus places membership prin-
cipally outside the Constitution as a conflicting phenomenon, the current
Constitution expresses a constitutional commitment towards the Union and pro-
vides a speciﬁc provision for the transfer of powers to the Union. Now, the
Constitution recognises transfers of powers and, additionally, only a signiﬁcant
transfer of powers to the EU requires a qualiﬁed majority; the application of the
institution of exceptive enactments is no longer needed for such transfer. As such,
the idea of the provision is clearly based on a transfer, not on a limitation of state
powers. The amendment shows a dynamic – instead of static – understanding of the
integration norm of the Finnish Constitution. In the interpretation of a possible
transfer, one has to also take into consideration that Finland is already a member of
the EU, which is part of the fundamental organisation of Finland according to the
Constitution as well (Sect. 1(3)).25
Neither the incorporation Act of the Accession Treaty nor the Constitution
contain any provisions on the domestic effects and status of EU law within the
Finnish legal system. Nevertheless, the travaux préparatoires reflect the idea of
their status and effects according to the view of the EU. The standard understanding
is that EU law enjoys legal effects and status as prescribed by EU law and inter-
preted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Nevertheless, this
opinion is not straightforward, and opinions vary when it comes to possible col-
lisions in the constitutional sphere.26 Thus, the issue is much more nuanced. The
situation has now also been modiﬁed by the recent amendments, and it is evident
that they show a clearer constitutional commitment towards EU membership and
various obligations stemming from it. In the national implementation of EU leg-
islation, the constitutional requirement that the domestic standard of protection of
constitutional and human rights not be compromised has on some occasions limited
the implementation of EU law. However, in some cases, the practice has been more
adaptive and flexible.27 It has been noted that the Finnish system, which gives
Parliament and its Constitutional Law Committee the opportunity to take part in the
preparation of national positions on proposals for EU secondary legislation, allows
them to express opinions to guide the Government and avoid possible conflicts
prior to the adoption of a ﬁnal EU legislative act.
1.3.2 For Finland, it is certainly fair to say ‘that an older interpretation of absolute
sovereignty has been replaced by a modern, revised approach’ (cf. the
Questionnaire) during EU membership. The concept has gone through a remarkable
change. Whereas every international obligation prior to EU membership was
considered to be in grave conflict with the Constitution – like EU membership itself
as it was considered to affect Finnish sovereignty – today, the understanding of the
concept has developed to mean that being a member in this kind of arrangement is a
use of sovereignty. Thus, the construction of the constitutional concept of
25 Salminen 2015.
26 See discussion in Heinonen 2012.
27 See especially Ojanen 2009c, pp. 129–174, Ojanen 2003 and Ojanen 2004, p. 542.
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sovereignty is very different, to say the least. The sovereignty of Finland is qualiﬁed
by the international obligations binding on Finland. Among them, membership in
the EU has special status.28
1.3.3 With the entry into force of the Constitution of 2000, formulations which had
ﬁrst appeared in legal research and in the practice of the Constitutional Law
Committee found their way into the Constitution and its travaux préparatoires. In
the travaux, the EU was accorded special status, which was soon also recognised in
the practice of the Constitutional Law Committee, and thus there is far greater
tolerance for limitations on sovereignty stemming from membership in the EU than
those arising from international obligations. The openness towards the EU has been
further modiﬁed by the latest amendments of 2012, which clearly underline the
commitment towards European integration.29 There are, however, some counter-
tendencies in the constitutional practice. The recent events and legal implications of
the crisis of the monetary and economic union have once again raised some con-
cerns about sovereignty. In this context, the Finnish position that unanimous
decision-making protects Finnish sovereignty and especially the budgetary powers
of Parliament can be understood as a sign that changes in attitudes towards inte-
gration are not yet consistent.30
Prior to the Constitution of 2000, the constitutional acts did not include any
explicit limits to the use of exceptive enactments. The Constitution of 2000
introduced limitations to the use of exceptive enactments and to acceptance of
international obligations. According to Sect. 73 of the Constitution, a derogation
made by an exceptive enactment to the Constitution has to be limited in nature.
Additionally, another possible limitation was introduced, since according to
Sect. 94(3), an international obligation shall not endanger the democratic founda-
tions of the Constitution. Both of these requirements were interpreted in the context
of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.31 Because of the recent changes,
the transfers of powers no longer have the status of exceptive enactments, and the
limitations enacted for the use of exceptive enactments are no longer applicable.
Nevertheless, the requirement of Sect. 94(3) of the Constitution is still applicable as
it concerns international obligations as such. The issue of democratic foundations
has not really been developed in the constitutional practice of the Constitutional
Law Committee: this is because there have not, obviously, been any situations in
which there has been a need for this. However, when the Constitutional Treaty was
28 For an extensive recent analysis of the change in the concept of sovereignty in Finnish con-
stitutional law and doctrine see Mutanen 2015 who concludes that Finland has moved from a
‘sovereignist to a non-sovereignist Constitution’ (p. 359); the sovereignty provisions, read together
with the amendments, have acquired a new meaning and have led to a more integration-friendly
understanding in the Finnish legal discourse. See especially Ojanen 2004 and Salminen 2004.
29 Salminen 2015.
30 See discussion in Leino and Salminen 2013.
31 Opinions 13/2008 (on the Treaty of Lisbon) and 36/2006 (on the Constitutional Treaty) of the
Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament (hereinafter Constitutional Law Committee).
372 T. Ojanen and J. Salminen
incorporated into Finnish Law, this Section was referred to upon consideration of
whether the Union, based on the Constitutional Treaty, would endanger the
democratic foundations of the Constitution.32 In so doing, special emphasis was put
on the reforms which were put in effect later by the Lisbon Treaty.
No particular ﬁeld of state powers nor any ﬁelds of legislation are excluded from
a possible transfer of powers. However, any transfer of powers based on an
international obligation shall, according to Sect. 94(3), not endanger the democratic
foundations of the Constitution. This could be considered as a limit to or at least as
a condition for such a transfer.
1.3.4 The Finnish Supreme Courts – both the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Administrative Court – apply EU law, and accept both direct effect and primacy per
se. However, not many cases have been reported in which the courts have set aside
Finnish legislation or a conflict has been identiﬁed where EU law was of relevance.
In particular, there are no reports concerning cases where EU law has allegedly
been in conflict with the very fundamental questions of Finnish fundamental rights.
In addition, it seems that the Finnish courts are not very active in making references
to the CJEU either. These features might have many explanations. However, the
primary explanation is not that there is resistance to EU law as such. There might be
a tendency to resolve any possible prima facie conflict by interpretation via an
EU-friendly interpretation, for which at least the Finnish Constitution now provides
many possible legal arguments. The fact that the courts have never made a reference
to the CJEU concerning the validity of EU secondary law might, however, be based
in the Finnish constitutional culture, for which the possibility to question the
validity of a legislative act on the basis of a constitutional argument is a relatively
new phenomenon.
Noteworthy in the Finnish context is, of course, that the Constitutional Law
Committee has stated that the domestic implementation of directives and other EU
instruments cannot weaken the domestic standard of rights protection.33 Typically,
this has not proved to be a problem at all. Since EU measures that regulate the rights
and obligations of individuals or are otherwise of a legislative nature within the
meaning of the Finnish Constitution must be implemented by Acts of Parliament in
accordance with the same procedure as for domestic legislative enactments, the
Constitutional Law Committee may also review the constitutionality of domestic
implementing enactments of EU measures. The implementation of EU measures
should conform to the requirements originating in the domestic system for the
protection of constitutional and human rights. This is, of course, a bold statement,
and implementation seems to be rather flexible; there are many ways to adapt and
conform with the requirements of European law. The obvious tendency seems to be
towards a fusion of the various regimes and their requirements. As EU proposals for
legislation may be reviewed by the Constitutional Law Committee, potential
problems can be addressed before the relevant national legislation is passed.
32 Opinion 36/2006 (on the Constitutional Treaty) of the Constitutional Law Committee.
33 E.g. Opinion 25/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
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1.4 Democratic Control
1.4.1 Already for membership in the European Economic Area, the constitutional
acts were amended so as to provide for the strong participation and information
rights of Parliament.
Regarding the procedural requirements, Sect. 96(2) of the Constitution (for the
text of the relevant provisions see Sect. 1.2.1) speciﬁes the ways in which the
Government must communicate the proposals for EU acts, agreements and other
measures without delay in order to determine Parliament’s position. In matters that
fall within Parliament’s competence, its position in practice equals the Finnish
position, even if Parliament usually leaves the details to the Government’s dis-
cretion and limits itself to steering the main political lines. Union proposals are
considered by the Parliament’s Grand Committee and usually also in one or more of
the sub-committees. The Government is obliged to keep the relevant committees
updated with information on the negotiations and to keep the Grand Committee
informed of its position. Section 97 includes provisions on Parliament’s right to
receive information on international affairs. It requires the Government to keep the
Grand Committee informed through reports on the preparation of EU matters other
than those falling under Sect. 96, either upon request or when otherwise necessary.
This concerns, for example, the preliminary stages of a decision making process or
matters in which the Council does not formally act. Under Sect. 97(2), the Prime
Minister is required to provide information on matters on the European Council
agenda, both before and after its meetings, and on envisaged amendments to the
Treaties. On the basis of the information provided, the committees, including the
Constitutional Law Committee, may issue statements to the Government.
There is a widely shared view that the system functions well. Of further rele-
vance here is that the traditional interpretation of Sects. 96 and 97, which have
generally been understood to extend beyond matters that formally belong to Union
competence to questions that can be considered ‘comparable’ to Union matters,
both as regards their substance and their effects.34 The Constitutional Law
Committee has interpreted many measures as matters belonging to Sect. 96 or 97,
whether formally taken within the Union framework or not. It has thereby allocated
the primary competence in these matters to the Government under Sect. 93(2),
equally placing it under a strict obligation to report to Parliament on all matters
falling under the competence of the latter.
1.4.2 Finnish constitutional history records only two referendums, of which one
was held on the very matter of the accession of Finland to the Union.35 The Finnish
Constitution provides for the possibility of a consultative referendum, on which a
34 Viljanen 2003, and Ojanen 2004.
35 The other was the advisory referendum organised in the 1930s post legem on the Prohibition
Act that limited the production, sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
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decision shall be made by an Act of Parliament. Today there is the additional
possibility of a citizens’ initiative pursuant to Sect. 56 of the Constitution.
1.5 The Reasons for, and the Role of, EU Amendments
1.5.1–1.5.3 The recent EU related amendments of the Finnish Constitution were
mostly motivated by the desire to improve the openness and transparency of the
Constitution. As an argument, the completeness of the Constitution was used in the
meaning that the Constitution should give an accurate picture of the constitutionally
relevant issues in Finland.36 When the Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty
were incorporated into Finnish law, the Constitutional Law Committee of
Parliament in particular raised this issue. However, amendment was not constitu-
tionally required. The Committee only advised that there would be reason to
consider amending the Constitution both regarding the special provision concerning
the transfer of powers and regarding the need to expressly mention the EU.37
In the preparation of the EU related amendments, the most important rationale
was the need to take the Constitution seriously and to reflect the shift of power to
the supranational level.38 It was motivated by the need for transparency and the
requirement of the completeness of the Constitution. Many comparisons were made
between various solutions within various Member States, but no clear common
denominator was found. There was also some discussion in the Finnish legal lit-
erature on this issue.39
When evaluating the current state of the Finnish Constitution and its EU related
amendments adopted during Finland’s EU membership, there seems to be good
reason to consider that the relationship between the EU and Finland and Finland as
an integrated state have matured. EU membership and the further constitutionali-
sation of the EU have not rendered the national constitution useless. The Finnish
discourse has found it important to strike a balance between national constitutional
law and European constitutional law. The amendments contribute to this balance.
While they interconnect the orders, they also clearly open the orders to mutual
influence. Opening and constitutionalising EU membership on the national con-
stitutional level does not weaken the Constitution for Finland. On the contrary, it
has opened new perspectives and possibilities for reciprocal stabilisation.
36 Salminen 2010a, b.
37 Opinions 13/2008 (on the Treaty of Lisbon) and 36/2006 (on the Constitutional Treaty) of the
Constitutional Law Committee.
38 Thus, the guidelines in Claes 2005 and Albi 2005 were followed, as suggested by Salminen
2010a, b.
39 See also Mutanen 2015, pp. 310–323.
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2 Constitutional Rights, the Rule of Law and EU Law
2.1 The Position of Constitutional Rights and the Rule
of Law in the Constitution
2.1.1 A comprehensive reform of the domestic system for the protection of con-
stitutional rights and human rights entered into force on 1 August 1995.
International human rights treaties binding on Finland, with the ECHR at their apex,
featured as the main source of inspiration and stimulus for this reform. As a result of
the reform, the current fundamental rights catalogue in Chap. 2 of the Constitution
of Finland is broad and comprehensive. It sets out a range of economic, social and
cultural rights, in addition to traditional civil and political rights. Moreover, there
are speciﬁc provisions on such rights as everyone’s responsibility for the envi-
ronment and environmental rights (Sect. 20), the right to a fair trial before an
independent and impartial court or tribunal within a reasonable time (Sect. 21(1))
and on the right to good administration (Sect. 21(2)). As a rule, fundamental rights
are granted to everyone, with an exception being made only with regard to freedom
of movement (Sect. 9) and certain electoral rights (Sect. 14).40
The domestic standard of protection of fundamental rights is intended to ascend
to a high level. The established constitutional doctrine is that international human
rights obligations binding on Finland feature as a minimum standard of protec-
tion.41 However, the de facto implementation of this doctrinal premise leaves a lot
to be desired in light of critical observations on the situation of human rights in
Finland by international treaty bodies. For instance, since the entry into force of the
ECHR in 1990, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found a vio-
lation by Finland in well over 100 judgments.42
Just before Finland joined the EU in 1995, there was concern that EU member-
ship might somehow dilute the domestic standard of fundamental rights protection,
particularly in the areas of social rights and good administration. In light of this
concern, some provisions of the 1995 Constitutional Rights Reform were deliber-
ately designed to feature as ‘constitutional self-defence’ against such problematic
tendencies that might in the long run arise from EU membership. A reference can be
made to a provision on the right of access to information (Sect. 12(2)) and a rela-
tively far-reaching clause in Sect. 19 on the right to social security, guaranteeing
social rights to everyone. Some social rights, either by means of the relevant
40 See e.g. Scheinin 1996, pp. 257–280. On economic, social and cultural rights under the Finnish
Constitution, see Scheinin 2001. A thorough Finnish Constitutional Rights Commentary is pro-
vided by Hallberg et al. 2011.
41 See the preparatory works of the reform of the domestic system for the protection of consti-
tutional rights, such as Government Bill 309/1993 and Report 25 of 1994 of the Constitutional
Law Committee.
42 The major problem area has related to Art. 6 of the ECHR, but there are relatively many
judgments by the ECtHR ﬁnding a violation by Finland of Arts. 8 and 10 of the ECHR.
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constitutional provision itself, or by means of Acts of Parliament, have also been
guaranteed as subjective rights directly enforceable through the courts.43 Similarly,
Sect. 21(2), which guarantees various attributes of the right to good administration,
may also be understood as imposing constitutional constraints on the potentially
harmful effects of European integration. As will be discussed in more detail below,
the domestic standard of protection of constitutional and human rights has occa-
sionally de facto compromised the maximal implementation of certain EU legal
measures.
While the current catalogue of constitutional rights is comprehensive insofar as
the substantive rights provisions are concerned, the Constitution of Finland is
largely, if not exclusively, silent on several important doctrines and principles
pertaining to the domestic protection of constitutional and human rights. Hence, one
must delve into the practice of the leading authority on constitutional interpretation
in Finland, the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament, and the travaux
préparatoires of the reform of Constitutional Rights Catalogue in order to get a grip
on them. For the present purposes, the following doctrines and principles pertaining
to constitutional rights are worthy of elaboration:
(i) Direct applicability and interpretive effect of constitutional rights. According
to the travaux préparatoires of the Reform of Constitutional Rights
Catalogue, one of the major aims of the reform was to increase the direct
application of constitutional rights by domestic courts and authorities. This
aim has also materialised in subsequent domestic court practice, in which
courts have not only invoked several provisions on civil and political rights
but have also treated several dimensions of social rights as ‘justiciable’.
However, the direct applicability of constitutional rights is watered down by
what can be called a minimalist approach to constitutional rights and human
rights: Finnish courts far too often tend to be satisﬁed with the minimum
standard of protection under the ECHR, as indicated by the existing case law
of the ECtHR. This practice already contradicts such a fundamental principle
regarding the relationship between constitutional rights and international
human rights as is the premise that domestic courts should provide rights
protection beyond the threshold where the ECtHR would ﬁnd a violation of
the ECHR.44
Moreover, it is ﬁrmly established doctrine that courts and authorities
should resort to a ‘constitutional rights-oriented’ approach to the interpre-
tation of domestic statutes, in order to avoid conflicts between constitutional
rights and domestic legislation, as well as to promote the effective obser-
vance of these rights. In everyday court practice the interpretive effect of
43 Finnish courts have treated several dimensions of social rights as ‘justiciable’. See e.g. the
following judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court: KHO 2000:36, KHO 2001:35 and
KHO 2001:50.
44 For minimalist approaches by Finnish courts and authorities regarding constitutional and human
rights, see in detail Lavapuro et al., pp. 523 and 524.
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constitutional rights is clearly the primary method of giving judicial effect to
constitutional rights. As it has been impossible to keep the interpretation of
constitutional rights provisions intact and untouched by the influence of
international human rights norms, the outcome has also been a human
rights-oriented approach to the interpretation of Finnish law, including the
Constitution.45
(ii) The semi-constitutional status, direct applicability and interpretive effect of
international human rights treaties. The third notable characteristic of the
domestic system for the protection of constitutional rights is the convergence
of the effects of constitutional rights and international human rights treaties.
Aside from providing a major source of inspiration for the concrete formu-
lations of the various material provisions on constitutional rights and the
methods of giving legal protection to constitutional rights, human rights
treaties binding on Finland assume a semi-constitutional status in the Finnish
legal order. This feature originates in several constitutional provisions that
make explicit reference both to domestic constitutional rights and to inter-
national human rights.46
However, aside from producing interpretive effect, the predominant
method of implementation of human rights treaties, the method of incorpo-
ration through an Act of Parliament, warrants the direct application of
human rights by domestic courts and authorities.47 As human rights treaties
have invariably been incorporated through Acts of Parliament, human rights
treaties enjoy ﬁrm formal status as Acts of Parliament within the Finnish
legal order so that they are in force in Finnish law according to their content
in international law, as seen in the light of the case law of their international
treaty bodies (and also in in their authentic languages which are decisive in
the case of questions of interpretation originating in translation errors or
ambiguities).48
(iii) The position of general principles of law in the Constitution. The
Constitution of Finland is largely, if not exclusively, silent on such general
45 This was established in Opinion 2/1990 of the Constitutional Law Committee. The principle of
a human-rights-friendly interpretation was reiterated in the context of the 1995 constitutional rights
reform.
46 See Scheinin 1996, p. 276.
47 See Scheinin 1996, p. 259. Also the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament noted in its
Opinion 2/1990 that the method of incorporation entails the direct applicability of human rights
treaties by domestic courts and authorities.
48 See e.g. Opinion 2/1990 of the Constitutional Law Committee on the direct applicability of the
ECHR due to the method of incorporation. For example, the Supreme Court of Finland has
explicitly stated that the ECHR and the ICCPR are ‘part of the law of the land’ due to the method
of incorporation by an Act of Parliament. See e.g. the decision of the Supreme Court, KKO
1993:19.
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principles of law as legal certainty and legitimate expectations. However,
both international human rights treaties and EU law have promoted a general
awareness among the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament and
Finnish courts and authorities of the signiﬁcance of these principles in the
context of cases pertaining to constitutional and human rights and issues of
constitutional law in general. Hence, the practice of both the Constitutional
Law Committee of Parliament and the domestic courts indicates that the
principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations have a ﬁrm place in
domestic constitutional reasoning, e.g. in the context of cases pertaining to
the right to property (Sect. 15) or to the freedom to engage in commercial
activity (Sect. 18).49
While the general principles of law are generally recognised at the level of
constitutional doctrine, the principle of non-retroactivity features as an
exception to the rule, to the extent that Sect. 8 of the Constitution explicitly
recognises the prohibition of non-retroactivity in criminal cases (see
Sect. 2.3.2).50 However, the other dimensions of the principle of
non-retroactivity have gained a ﬁrm foothold in constitutional practice
through the Constitutional Law Committee and courts.51
2.1.2 The criteria for limiting constitutional rights The Constitution of Finland
lacks a provision stipulating the conditions under which restrictions can be imposed
on constitutional rights. However, it is ﬁrmly established constitutional doctrine that
all interferences with constitutional rights must be reviewed by the Constitutional
Law Committee of Parliament or the domestic courts in accordance with the fol-
lowing seven distinct, yet interrelated conditions:
(i) Limitations must be provided by an Act of Parliament.
(ii) Legislative provisions on limitations must be sufﬁciently clear and precise.
(iii) The essence of a constitutional right cannot be subject to limitations.
(iv) Limitations must have a legitimate aim that corresponds to the objectives of
general interest or the need to protect the fundamental rights of others.
(v) Limitations must conform to the principle of proportionality, including be
necessary for genuinely reaching the legitimate aim.
(vi) Limitations must be in conformity with human rights obligations binding on
Finland.
49 See e.g. Opinions 33/2002, 45/2002, 21/2004, 25/2005, 42/2006 of the Constitutional Law
Committee.
50 Section 8 of the Constitution, entitled ‘The principle of legality in criminal cases’, provides as
follows: ‘No one shall be found guilty of a criminal offence or be sentenced to a punishment on the
basis of a deed, which has not been determined punishable by an Act at the time of its commission.
The penalty imposed for an offence shall not be more severe than that provided by an Act at the
time of commission of the offence.’ (Emphasis added).
51 See e.g. Opinions 33/1998, 34/1998, 37/1998, 63/2002 and 42/2006 of the Constitutional Law
Committee.
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(vii) There must exist adequate legal safeguards (judicial review, the right to
appeal, the right to be heard, etc.) regarding interferences with constitutional
rights.52
Each condition listed above has an autonomous function to fulﬁl. As these
conditions are cumulative, one failure sufﬁces to result in a conclusion that an
interference amounts to a violation of the Constitution. Given all these character-
istics, the permissible limitations test under the Constitution of Finland is one of
those concrete arrangements that generates both substantive and doctrinal coher-
ence between the ECHR and other human rights treaties, notably the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Yet, as international human rights treaties feature as a mini-
mum standard of rights protection, the permissible limitations test under the
Constitution of Finland is, at least potentially, more rigorous than e.g. the standard
three-partite test under the ECHR. However, it also warrants emphasis that if the
Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament is of the view that a legislative pro-
posal pending before Parliament fails under the permissible limitations test, it does
not declare the legislative proposal invalid or null and void. Instead, the Committee
usually proposes modiﬁcations to the bill so as to achieve compliance with con-
stitutional and human rights.
2.1.3 The position of the rule of law Up until the entry into force of the
Constitution of Finland on 1 March 2000, the principle of the rule of law remained
unmentioned in the text of the Constitution. Nevertheless, some important
dimensions of the rule of law, such as access to courts (Sect. 21(1)) and the
requirement of limitations on constitutional rights ‘being provided by the law’ were
recognised either within the text of the Constitution or in constitutional doctrine or
practice.
Nowadays, however, the Constitution of Finland explicitly recognises the rule of
law, as Sect. 2(3) provides as follows:
The exercise of public powers shall be based on an Act. In all public activity, the law shall
be strictly observed.
The systematic location of this provision in Chap. 1 of the Constitution, entitled
‘Fundamental provisions’, also reveals that the rule of law is one of the most
fundamental principles of the Constitution, alongside sovereignty, the inviolability
of human dignity and the freedom and rights of the individual, justice, democracy,
parliamentarism and the separation of powers.
Moreover, such elementary dimensions or attributes of the rule of law as the
principle of legality – particularly the requirement that the rights and obligations of
individuals be provided by an Act of Parliament – or access to courts are relatively
frequently invoked by individuals before domestic courts. Administrative courts in
52 See Report 25/1994 of the Constitutional Law Committee, pp. 4–5. For a comprehensive
examination of the permissible limitations test under the Constitution, see Viljanen 2001.
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particular have treated the rule of law as justiciable in reviewing the legality of
administrative decisions or other measures; several Opinions of the Constitutional
Law Committee of Parliament in the context of ex ante review of legislative pro-
posals include explicit references to the rule of law principle.53
2.2 The Balancing of Fundamental Rights and Economic
Freedoms in EU Law
2.2.1 As already noted in Sect. 2.1.1, on the verge of Finnish EU membership in the
mid-1990s, there was concern that European integration might dilute the domestic
protection of fundamental rights. One of the major reasons for this anxiety was the
thinking that such economic market freedoms as the free movement of goods and
workers or the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in par-
ticular constituted the ‘core’ of the EU legal order, whereas the protection of
fundamental rights featured only as a dimension of EU law, with the result that
economic freedoms tended to have an edge over fundamental rights in cases
involving balancing between economic freedoms and fundamental rights.
While these domestic concerns have not been totally groundless, they have
nonetheless proved to be exaggerated. The years of EU membership since 1995 have
not prompted any widespread or serious concern about the EU excessively priori-
tising economic liberties over fundamental and human rights. Although the tendency
in recent years has been towards the weakening of the welfare state and the lowering
of the standard of protection of social rights, it is submitted here that EU law or EU
membership in general has not been a major impetus for this tendency.
However, some individual judgments by the CJEU in cases such as Laval and
Viking54 in particular have generated some domestic debate over the appropriate
balance between economic freedoms and fundamental rights. However, instead of
any straightforward and unanimous view that the balance has tilted too far in the
direction of economic freedoms at the expense of fundamental rights, the domestic
views regarding these two cases have been relatively polarised, especially among
the Finnish economic and political elite. While some have hailed these decisions
from a free market perspective, others have criticised them, particularly from a
labour law perspective for their interference with the fundamental premises of
collective labour law and the industrial relations of states.55
In addition, the so-called euro crisis has prompted constitutional concern
regarding the effects of the crisis on the appropriate protection of fundamental social
rights.56
53 See Opinions 21/2009, 67/2010 and 33/2012 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
54 Case C-438-/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767.
55 See e.g. Ojanen 2011, pp. 127–131.
56 See Tuori and Tuori 2014.
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2.3 Constitutional Rights, the European Arrest Warrant
and EU Criminal Law
2.3.1–2.3.3 The presumption of innocence, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege, fair trial and in absentia judgments
In Finland, the Constitutional Law Committee reviewed both the proposal for the
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant57 (EAW)58 and its domestic
implementing enactment59 for compatibility with the Constitution and international
human rights obligations binding on Finland. However, the constitutional obser-
vations by the Committee revolved around other issues pertaining to the EAW, such
as the extradition of Finnish citizens, the rule of double criminality, the extradition
of minors, the protection of family life and certain other issues relating to funda-
mental and human rights. In particular, the extradition of Finnish citizens and the
issue of dual criminality warranted constitutional attention by the Committee,
simply because Finland at the time in the early 2000s still adhered to the principle
of double criminality and the prohibition on extraditing Finnish nationals.60
By contrast, the Constitutional Law Committee remained totally silent on the
issue of the presumption of innocence within the context of the European Arrest
Warrant. Neither have concerns with regard to the presumption of innocence arisen
in domestic court proceedings.61 In fact, any concern over the appropriate obser-
vance of the right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence, has only
been voiced by some individual judicial actors, such as the President of the
Supreme Court of Finland, Justice Pauliine Koskelo, in some of her public remarks.
While the abolition of double criminality was one of the issues that warranted
the attention of the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament, it should be
emphasised that the Committee eventually did not ﬁnd this issue to be a reason for
constitutional concern. Instead, the Committee took the view that the domestic
implementing act for the European Arrest Warrant limited the scope of application
of the European Arrest Warrant without veriﬁcation of the double criminality of the
57 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), [2002] OJ L 190/1.
58 Opinion of 42/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
59 Opinion of 18/2003 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
60 Up until 1 October 2007, Sect. 9(3) of the Constitution of Finland provided as follows: ‘Finnish
citizens shall not be prevented from entering Finland or deported or extradited or transferred from
Finland to another country against their will.’ However, the Constitutional Law Committee (see
Opinion 13/2003) regarded the EAW as prompting the need for a constitutional amendment of this
constitutional provision on the extradition of Finnish citizens, so as to comply appropriately with
Finland’s international obligations and, speciﬁcally, obligations under EU law. The amendment
entered into force on 1 October 2007 with the result that the extradition of Finnish citizens is no
longer absolutely forbidden by the Constitution of Finland.
61 For constitutional concerns regarding the European Arrest Warrant in Finland, see Ojanen
2009b, pp. 143–156.
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acts constituting such offences as could be regarded as sufﬁciently ‘serious crimes’.
In addition, the Committee noted that the offences giving rise to surrender without
veriﬁcation of double criminality were also largely, if not exclusively, serious
crimes under domestic law. Finally, the Committee emphasised that the domestic
implementing act included grounds for mandatory non-execution that appropriately
limited the application of the European Arrest Warrant to what was constitutionally
acceptable.
In this context, it warrants emphasis that the bill for the domestic implementing
Act of the EAW (the Act on Extradition on the Basis of an Offence between Finland
and Other Member States of the European Union, Act No 1286 of 2003, the
so-called EU Extradition Act) included additional grounds for mandatory
non-execution of an EAW on which the European Arrest Warrant Framework
Decision is silent. As the Constitutional Law Committee also proposed a number of
additional speciﬁcations to the domestic implementation act for the EAW in order
to ensure the appropriate observance of constitutional and human rights,62 the
outcome was that the maximal implementation of the EAW Framework Decision
made way for the active observance of constitutional and human rights in Finland.63
Furthermore, the Committee of Legal Affairs of Parliament emphasised the need for
fundamental and human rights-friendly interpretation and application of the
European Arrest Warrant and its domestic implementing act, particularly insofar as
such grounds for mandatory refusal under Sect. 5 of the Act on Extradition on the
Basis of an Offence between Finland and Other Member States of the European
Union (Act No 1286 of 2003) are concerned.64 In particular, the necessity of
rights-friendly application was emphasised in relation to Sect. 5(6) of the domestic
implementing act, essentially requiring, inter alia, that extradition be refused if there
is cause to assume that the person requested would be subjected to a violation of his
or her human rights or constitutionality protected due process, freedom of speech or
freedom of association. In this context, the Legal Affairs Committee explicitly
emphasised the interconnections between Sect. 5(6), and such constitutional rights
as the right to a fair trial under Sect. 21 of the Constitution. By contrast, however,
no domestic constitutional discussion can be found on the issue of in absentia
judgments.65
Overall, the domestic implementation of the European Arrest Warrant
Framework Decision is one of those cases in which Finland has compromised the
62 See also Opinion 48/2002 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
63 For the details of the ‘Finnish constitutional challenge’ in the context of the domestic imple-
mentation of the EAW Framework Decision, see Ojanen 2009c.
64 Report 7/2003 of the Legal Affairs Committee of Parliament.
65 The rule under Sect. 28 the Act on Extradition on the Basis of an Offence Between Finland and
Other Member States of the European Union (Act No. 1286 of 2003) is clearly the presence of the
individual at the proceedings, or at least he or she shall be reserved an opportunity to be heard on
the contents of the request. However, Sect. 28(3) provides that if the requested person is absent
from the consideration of the matter without a lawful excuse, the question may be examined and
decided despite his or her absence. (Emphasis added).
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most effective domestic implementation of EU legislation for the sake of funda-
mental and human rights. Although there may thus be tension or even a conflict
between the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and its domestic
implementing act, it deserves notice that Finland was also praised by the UN
Human Rights Committee for its practice of trying to appropriately integrate fun-
damental and human rights into various legislative instruments aimed at countering
terrorism in 2004 as follows:
The Committee is pleased to observe the State party’s concern to integrate human rights
into action to combat terrorism, in part by maintaining an outright ban on extradition,
refoulement or expulsion to a country where the individual concerned might be exposed to
the death penalty and violations of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. (Concluding obser-
vations of the Human Rights Committee: Finland. 02/12/2004).66
The application of the European Arrest Warrant has already generated relatively
voluminous case law by the domestic courts. Up until now, there has been no evidence
of any judicial resistance on the part of domestic courts or authorities to apply and
enforce the European Arrest Warrant. The Finnish courts have also embraced the
effect of the EAW on the interpretation of Finnish law. Overall, the approach of
Finnish judicial authorities to the application of the European ArrestWarrant assumes
a pragmatic case-by-case approach. Each case is dealt with individually, without
expressing any bold and sweeping judicial observations on the European Arrest
Warrant and its relationship with Finnish law, including the domestic system for the
protection of fundamental and human rights. One looks in vain for any kind of bold
and sweeping observations on the ‘constitutional aspects’ of the EAW.
Indeed, what is still lacking is a ‘hard case’ inviting a Finnish court to really
ponder the application of the European Arrest Framework Decision and its
domestic implementing enactment in light of such constitutional and human rights
as the nulla poena sine lege rule or fair trial – or the compatibility of the domestic
implementing act with the European Arrest Framework Decision for that matter.67
Given how the need to adequately safeguard these rights shaped and directed the
enactment of the domestic implementing legislation for the EAW, and even to the
extent that it is justiﬁed to speak about ‘the Finnish constitutional challenge to the
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision’, extremely complicated questions
concerning the status and effects of constitutional and human rights in the appli-
cation of the European Arrest Warrant may sooner or later emerge. This is espe-
cially so because the highest constitutional authority of the country, the
Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament, has also generally emphasised that
66 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Finland. 02/12/2004. CCPR/CO/ 82/
FIN. (Concluding Observations/Comments), para. 4.
67 On 25 February 2010, a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of Finland
was lodged before the CJEU in Case C-105/10 PPU Gataev and Gataeva [2010] ECLI:EU:
C:2010:176. The reference included a number of questions directly or indirectly aimed at ﬁnding
out whether the domestic implementing enactment was in harmony with the Council Framework
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. However, the reference was subsequently withdrawn
due to the cancellation of the arrest warrant.
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the domestic implementation of EU legislation is not permitted to weaken the
domestic standard of protection of constitutional and human rights.68
2.3.4 The Right to a Fair Trial – Practical Challenges Regarding a Trial Abroad
2.3.4.1 In Finland, there has been only little discussion about the practical chal-
lenges regarding a trial abroad. However, when reviewing the proposal for the
domestic implementing act for the Framework Decision on the European Arrest
Warrant, the Legal Affairs Committee of Parliament briefly emphasised the
importance of ensuring that in each and every case appropriate legal aid and
assistance is provided to the extradited individual. Hence, the Committee empha-
sised that Finnish authorities should occasionally take advantage of the possibilities
under the Legal Aid Act (Act No 257 of 2002) even if the starting point is that the
Member State requesting the extradition of the individual is primarily responsible
for providing legal aid and assistance.69
2.3.5 The Right to Effective Judicial Protection: The Principle of Mutual
Recognition in EU Criminal Law and Abolition of the Exequatur in Civil and
Commercial Matters
2.3.5.2–2.3.5.4 Beyond what was already noted about the domestic constitutional
discussion surrounding the European Arrest Warrant, the principle of mutual
recognition has not been a matter of constitutional concern in Finland.
2.3.6 Constitutional Rights Regarding Other Aspects of EU Criminal Law
There has been constitutional concern in Finland that the domestic implementation of
EU criminal law may erode such fundamental constituents of the principle of legality
as those originating in ‘the quality of law’. After all, the principle of legality is not just
conﬁned to prohibiting the retrospective application of criminal law. In addition, this
principle embodies the fundamental principle that an offence must be clearly deﬁned
in law. This condition is essentially satisﬁed where the wording of the relevant pro-
vision indicates what acts and omissions will give rise to the individual’s criminal
liability. However, it warrants emphasis that this constitutional concern over the
erosion of the ‘quality of law’ standard has not related to the domestic implementation
of EU criminal law. Instead, there has been a general constitutional concern that the
domestic transposition of EU law has diluted the ‘quality of law’, particularly insofar
as the law constitutes an interference with fundamental rights. In such situations, the
permissible limitations test under the Finnish constitution requires that legislative
provisions on limitations must be sufﬁciently clear and precise.
Against this background, the Constitutional Law Committee has emphasised that
the domestic implementation of EU measures is not permitted to weaken the quality
of law standard.70 In addition, it has on several occasions emphasised the
68 Opinion 23/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
69 Report 7/2003 of the Legal Affairs Committee.
70 See e.g. Opinion 9/2004 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
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importance of taking the quality of law standard into account when implementing
EU criminal law at the level of domestic legislation. In particular, the Committee
has a very negative attitude to criminalisation ‘in blanco’, so that the implementing
act only mechanically states that the provisions of the EU measure in question ‘are
in force’ domestically.71
From this premise, the Committee has emphasised that the appropriate method
of implementing EU criminal law is transformation, i.e. enacting domestic criminal
law in harmony with the EU measure in question.
By contrast, the Committee has been very critical towards using the method of
incorporation so that the incorporating act simply states that the provisions of a
certain EU measure ‘are in force’ domestically.72 Similarly, the Committee has
been reserved regarding reference as a method of implementing EU criminal law.
This method involves clauses in domestic legislation stipulating that a certain EU
measure must be taken into account in the application of the domestic legislation in
question. It deserves emphasis that these constitutional reservations by the
Constitutional Law Committee regarding the use of methods of incorporation and
reference also apply regarding the implementation of EU law in general, although
they have become emphasised in the context of EU criminal law.
2.4 The EU Data Retention Directive
2.4.1 In Finland, the implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive73 in 2008
was not seen as posing a major constitutional problem. While the Constitutional
Law Committee regarded the domestic implementing enactment as constituting an
interference with the right to private life and the protection of personal data under
Sect. 10 of the Constitution and, accordingly, considered whether such interference
was justiﬁed under the permissible limitations test of the Finnish Constitution, the
Committee ended up taking the view that the domestic implementing enactment
passed the permissible limitations test.74 Hence, the Committee regarded the Act as
being in harmony with the Constitution. The primary reason for this outcome was
simply that the directive ‘only’ regulated the obligations of the service providers to
retain such communications data as location data and trafﬁc data. By contrast, the
directive did not regulate access to such data by the competent authorities of the
71 See e.g. Opinions 9/2007, 53/2006, 40/2002, 31/2002, 6/2002, 45/2001 and 5/1998 of the
Constitutional Law Committee.
72 The Committee adopted this view already during the very ﬁrst years of EU membership. See
e.g. Opinion 20/1997 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
73 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending
Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L 105/54.
74 See Opinion 3/2008 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
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Member States for law enforcement purposes. Moreover, the Directive explicitly
provided that no data revealing the content of the communication may be retained.
In Finland, these characteristics of the Directive combined to make the outcome that
the directive left enough leeway for the domestic legislator to take requirements
stemming from constitutional rights and human rights appropriately into account in
the implementation of the directive. Put differently, it can be said that Finland took
advantage of the margin of discretion left by the directive in a constitutional
rights-friendly way, by specifying the conditions for access to data and the length of
retention in domestic law much more narrowly than in the directive. Finally, it is to
be emphasised that the scope of mandatory data retention was limited only to such
data that the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or
of public communications networks were nonetheless generating or processing for
their own commercial purposes.
Originally, the data retention directive was implemented by means of an
amendment (Act No. 343 of 2008) of the Act on the Protection of Privacy in
Electronic Communications (Act No. 516/2004) that was intended to ensure con-
ﬁdentiality and protection of privacy in electronic communications. This Act
implemented Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 of the European Parliament
and of the Council concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector.75
Just recently, Finnish legislation in the area of electronic communications was
subject to a very comprehensive reform, as the New Information Society Code (Act
No. 917/2014) entered into force on 1 January 2015. This Code compiles all
domestic legislative provisions on electronic communications, including the pro-
visions on data retention. The Code also updates domestic legislation in areas such
as e-privacy, consumer protection, communications networks and data security, and
collects the formerly fragmentary legislative regime under one umbrella.
Originally, the proposal for the Information Code actually included more
extensive provisions on mandatory data retention than were previously required by
the Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications; the new Code
would have enabled retention of data collected in the context of browsing websites,
for example.
However, when the bill concerning the New Information Society Code was
pending before Parliament in spring 2014, the CJEU gave its judgment in the
Digital Rights Ireland case.76 The judgment signiﬁcantly affected the parliamentary
deliberations on the bill.
In April 2014, the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament gave its Opinion
on the proposed legislation in light of the Constitution of Finland and the CJEU’s
75 [2002] OJ L 201/37.
76 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
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ruling.77 In its Opinion, the Committee78 discussed the judgment by the CJEU in
the Digital Rights Ireland case at length when reviewing the Government Bill
(No. 221/2013) for the Information Society Code to the extent that the bill included
provisions on data retention. Although the Constitutional Law Committee did not
take the view that the judgment of the CJEU would prevent the adoption of new
domestic legislation on mandatory data retention, the Committee nonetheless
required some signiﬁcant speciﬁcations to the proposal so as to achieve compliance
with the Finnish Constitution and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as seen in
the light of the CJEU’s judgment. The following points are worthy of elaboration
for the present purposes:
1. The Constitutional Law Committee took the view that the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, as interpreted by the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland, still
applies in this area despite the invalidity of the Data Retention Directive. Hence,
the Finnish legislator was bound to take the Charter into account alongside the
Constitution even though the Data Retention Directive was invalid ex tunc. The
Committee apparently took the applicability of the Charter for granted since its
opinion does not include any speciﬁc reasoning as to why the Charter still
applies despite the invalidity of the Data Retention Directive ex tunc.
2. The Committee required the removal of all explicit references in the proposed
legislation to the Data Retention Directive. It also demanded some other
modiﬁcations to the bill, so as to comply with the requirements stemming from
the right to privacy and the protection of personal data under Sect. 10 of the
Finnish Constitution and the EU Charter, essentially requiring that data be
retained only when strictly necessary for investigation, detection and prosecu-
tion in relation to a serious crime.
3. The Committee noted that its own well-established doctrine regarding the
constitutional protection of ‘metadata’ (information about parties and about
messages being sent and delivered between them) should be revised. Earlier, the
constitutional doctrine had been that the processing of metadata was invariably
seen as falling within such ‘peripheral areas’ of privacy and data protection
where relatively wide-ranging limitations were permissible because the legis-
lator was understood to enjoy a wide margin of discretion. Conversely, the
intensity of constitutional review by the Committee of legislative provisions
involving the processing of metadata had been ‘low’. Now, however, the
Committee took the view that the distinction between the content of electronic
communications and such metadata as location data and trafﬁc data could no
longer be treated as a determining factor for the assessment of the level of
fundamental rights intrusions. As a combination of various forms of metadata
77 Opinion 18/2014 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
78 The Constitutional Law Committee submitted its Opinion to the Transport and Communications
Committee of Parliament which also discussed at length the provisions on data retention, including
the judgment by the CJEU. Also, the Administration Committee (Opinion of 9/2014) gave its
Opinion on the bill, including observations on data retention.
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can reveal a lot of conﬁdential and sensitive personal information, constitutional
attention should also be given to the assessment of the details of a particular
situation, i.e. what types of metadata are at issue and what is their combined
effect upon the right to privacy and data protection.
4. The Committee concluded that the proposed legislation did not include the flaws
that jointly triggered the invalidity of the Data Retention Directive in the
CJEU’s judgment.
5. The Information Society Code with its provisions on mandatory data retention
entered into force on 1 January 2015. According to the revised Sect. 157 of the
Information Society Code, telecommunications companies, which are to be
speciﬁed by a decision of the Ministry of the Interior (sisäministeriö), must
retain location and trafﬁc data as follows: (1) 12 months for data from a mobile
network-based telephone or SMS-service; (2) 6 months for data from an
internet-based telephone service, and (3) 9 months for data from an internet
connection service. The retained data may only be used in the investigation and
prosecution of the serious crimes stipulated in Chap. 10 Sect. 6(2) of the
Coercive Measures Act (Pakkokeinolaki, Act No. 806/2011).
Hence, the period of retention is limited to 12 months at the most, and only data
necessary for the purpose of preventing or investigating relatively serious crimes
can be retained. Finnish law also seeks to make at least some distinctions between
the categories of data on the basis of their possible usefulness for the purposes of
the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crimes.
Also, authorisation by a court is invariably necessary for each request for access
to retained data, i.e. access is always dependent on a prior review carried out by a
court, as required by the CJEU. Furthermore, unlike in the Directive, Finnish law
includes relatively strict conditions on access to and exchange of retained data,
including by specifying the national authorities that may be granted access to data
to be retained. Finally, Finnish law provides for safeguards relating to the security
and protection of data retained by private providers of electronic communications.
In conclusion, Finnish law seems to meet at least several of the requirements set
out by the CJEU for mandatory data retention quite well although there is certainly
room for arguing that the scope of application of retention should still be more
limited in order to curtail the legislative framework on mandatory data retention to
what is ‘strictly necessary’ as the CJEU required in its judgment.
Finally, it deserves emphasis that the judgment by the CJEU exempliﬁes how the
case law of the EU Court of Justice can make a positive contribution to the evo-
lution of domestic constitutional law in the area of fundamental rights protection.
Indeed, the impact of EU membership on the domestic system for the protection of
fundamental and human rights has often been positive, rather than harmful, in the
context of several constitutional rights in Finland. Examples of the positive effects
of EU membership abound, but the most noteworthy are perhaps those positive
effects of EU membership that pertain to the constitutional protection of
non-discrimination and equality.
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2.5 Unpublished Or Secret Legislation
2.5.1 In Finland, the constitutionality of unpublished or secret measures has not
been raised as an issue. However, it may be added that generally the Constitution
prohibits the existence of any ‘secret’ or ‘unpublished’ legislation. To begin with,
Sect. 79 of the Constitution, entitled ‘Publication and entry into force of Acts’,
explicitly requires that the Government shall ‘without delay’ publish an Act in the
Statutes of Finland after signature by the President of the Republic (Sect. 2).
Moreover, subsection 4 of the same provision unequivocally requires that all Acts
‘are enacted and published in Finnish and Swedish’ that enjoy the status of ‘national
languages of Finland’ in accordance with Sect. 17(1), of the Constitution.79 Hence,
it can be said that the validity of the law does not only depend on its publication per
se but on its enactment and publication in both Finnish and Swedish. Finally, it also
follows from the rule of law principle and the permissible limitations test for
interferences with constitutional rights that each and every piece of legislation must
be accessible and published, especially insofar as that legislation includes provi-
sions on the exercise of public powers or the rights and obligations of individuals or
other private parties.
2.6 Rights and General Principles of Law in the Context
of Market Regulation: Property Rights, Legal Certainty,
Non-retroactivity and Proportionality
2.6.1 In Finland, EU law has not directly affected the standard of protection of
constitutional rights in the area of property rights. However, it can be noted on a
general level that, as with the ECHR, EU law has contributed to a general incli-
nation towards a model of constitutional reasoning in which general principles,
inductive reasoning, precedents and case law make up the methods and body of
both human rights law and rights constitutionalism. Namely, the traditional Finnish
approach was characterised by a very formal, rule-focused reasoning that basically
reflected the idea that the legislature has the competence to deﬁne the actual content
of constitutional rights and that judicial powers must be exercised in this
pre-legislated and judicially self-restrained framework. However, both international
human rights law and EU law have emerged as one of the major reasons under-
pinning the transformation in the Finnish constitutional and human rights culture in
79 Aside from providing explicitly that Finnish and Swedish are the national languages of Finland,
Sect. 17(2), guarantees the right of everyone to use his or her own language, either Finnish or
Swedish, before courts of law and other authorities, and to receive ofﬁcial documents in that
language. Moreover, the public authorities are obliged to provide ‘for the cultural and societal
needs of the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking populations of the country on an equal basis’.
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which reasoning based on such principles as legal certainty, non-retroactivity and
proportionality have assumed greater signiﬁcance in constitutional reasoning.80
2.7 The ESM Treaty, Austerity Programmes
and the Democratic, Rule-of-Law-Based State
2.7.1 The constitutionality of euro crisis measures, among them the Treaty
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), has been discussed
widely in Finland, both during the negotiation of the various crisis measures – be
they international treaties or EU secondary law measures – as well as during the
time of approving the measures at national level.81 Ultimately, Parliament has
approved all the new agreements and brought them into force nationally, and has
given the Government a mandate to approve the Union measures. The
Constitutional Law Committee has taken a rather active role in evaluating these
measures.82
Already during negotiations, the draft ESM Treaty was addressed by Parliament
under Sect. 96 speciﬁcally due to its effects on state ﬁnances. In the process of
approving the Treaty, it was not considered to result in such a transfer of compe-
tence that would have to be considered signiﬁcant (Sects. 94(2) and 95(2), of the
Constitution). The Treaty was accepted in Parliament and brought into force
nationally in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure pertaining to an Act
of Parliament.
The drafts of the ESM Treaty were scrutinised ex ante by Parliament and its
Constitutional Law Committee before the treaty was submitted to the Parliament for
ﬁnal approval. The Constitutional Law Committee had established that the treaty
impinged upon the legislative and budgetary powers of Parliament and thus
approval by the latter was required. In some matters the Committee considered
unanimous decision making in the stability mechanisms to be a precondition for
compatibility with Finnish sovereignty and the Constitution. In particular, the
emergency decision making procedure and the scope of decision making by
qualiﬁed majority in the ESM Board of Governors provoked constitutionality
issues. In the ex ante review, it seemed that the ﬁnancial liabilities of Finland could
also be increased by a qualiﬁed majority decision of the Board of Governors above
the maximum limit deﬁned in the Treaty, even if Finland opposed such a decision.
This possibility was considered to affect national sovereignty and the budgetary
competence of the Finnish Parliament, and led to demands to specify the agreement
in this respect.83 The Finnish constitutional demands were understood during the
80 For these effects of European integration on the Finnish legal culture, see e.g. Ojanen 2009a.
81 See for example Leino and Salminen 2013, and Tuori and Tuori 2014.
82 See the numerous Opinions of the Committee listed in Leino and Salminen 2013.
83 Opinions 25/2011, 22/2011, 1/2011 and 13/2012 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
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negotiations on the European level, and the unanimity requirement was introduced
into the Treaty.
According to the previously adopted interpretation, when considering the Treaty,
the Constitutional Law Committee assessed the amount of Finnish capital invest-
ment in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the related risks against the
so-called Constitution-based obligations of the state.84 It required that all the
ﬁnancial liabilities and investments in the various parallel mechanisms be calcu-
lated in order to get a clearer picture of the liabilities. In order to establish the
applicable procedure for the approval and bringing into force of the Treaty, the
Committee considered the total amount of public debt and the risks of the invest-
ment. In the ESM, the Finnish part of the paid-in capital (1.4 billion EUR) and on
demand callable capital (11 billion EUR) was found to be extensive when compared
for example with the annual state budget. The annual state budget is approximately
54 billion EUR (2015). The paid capital is under 1% of the annual GDP, and the
maximum is about 5% of the GDP.
Of major importance for the evaluation of the state’s current liabilities and
whether these might possibly compromise the ability of the state to take respon-
sibility for its constitutional duties was the interpretation that Parliament has the
possibility to genuinely control and influence the Finnish member of the ESM
Board of Governors, where for example decisions on the capital payments are made
unanimously. Through these interpretations of its participation and information
rights, Parliament is now involved in the functioning of the mechanisms. Parliament
has based the requirement concerning its participation in national decision making
on Sects. 96 and 97 of the Constitution. The Finnish Parliament has considered that,
for example, decisions relating to the granting of loans are as to their nature and
their ﬁnancial implications considered to be so signiﬁcant that they require the
provision of relevant information by the Government prior to decision making
within the ESM in order to safeguard the prerogatives of the Parliament. It has even
required that these constitutional requirements for the participation of Parliament
through the national representative be reflected in the decision making rules,
arrangements and practices within the ESM.85
2.7.2 When the elements of the Banking Union were discussed for the ﬁrst time in
the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament in the ex ante review of the
proposals, the Committee took a rather dubious, perhaps even a somewhat suspi-
cious position towards the competence of the Union, and some elements in the
international treaty (Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to
the Single Resolution Fund) that were planned in this context were evaluated as to
whether they possibly contained constitutionally problematic features.86 When it
then later reviewed the national implementing legislation and the same legislation
84 See Opinions 13/2012 and concerning the European Financial Security Facility and the
Framework Agreement Opinion 5/2011 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
85 Opinion 13/2012 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
86 Opinion 28/2013 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
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package contained the approval of an international agreement between the Member
States and its incorporation into national law, no such problems were raised. While
the legislation was carefully evaluated, it was not, however, deemed to cause
problems which would have affected the relevant procedure. The international
agreement was approved as it was not considered to result in a transfer of com-
petence that would need to be considered signiﬁcant (Sects. 94(2) and 95(2) of the
Constitution), and it was accepted in Parliament and brought into force nationally in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure pertaining to an Act of
Parliament.87
2.7.3 Not applicable. Finland has not been subject to a bailout or austerity
programme.
2.8 Judicial Review of EU Measures: Access to Justice
and the Standard of Review
2.8.1 Up until now, Finnish courts have yet to request a preliminary ruling by the
CJEU on the validity of an EU measure. The peculiarity of the lack of preliminary
ruling requests to the CJEU on the validity of EU measures is emphasised by the
fact that the number of cases involving the application of constitutional rights and
human rights by the courts has proliferated signiﬁcantly since the mid-1990s.
Furthermore, there have been a number of the speciﬁc form of constitutional
challenge to the implementation of EU legislation at the legislative phase, as was
already noted in the context of the domestic implementation of the European Arrest
Warrant Framework Decision.
It may be added in this context that the total number of references by Finnish
courts for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU has remained low. As of the end of
2014, Finnish courts had made 91 references.88 Given that Finland joined the EU in
1995, the total number of references is so low that it may evince some sort of
judicial ‘resistance’ to or ‘shunning’ of EU law by the Finnish courts.89 However,
Finnish courts have embraced such fundamental qualities of EU law as direct effect,
indirect effect and primacy well, although the cases in which Finnish courts have
given primacy to EU law over conflicting national law have remained relatively few
in number. Instead, EU law predominantly enters Finnish courts in the form of
questions concerning the effect of EU law on the interpretation of Finnish law (the
indirect effect of EU law). This approach appears to be of particular importance in
cases involving prima facie tension between EU law and national law. In such
cases, Finnish courts try to interpret, to the extent possible, national law in harmony
87 Opinion 25/2014 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
88 It is also signiﬁcant to note that the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland alone has made 45
references for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU.
89 For the application of EU law in Finnish courts, see in more detail Ojanen 2009a, pp. 198–201.
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with EU law so as to avoid any open conflict. The traditional constitutional doctrine
emphasising the subordination of the judiciary to the legislature probably explains
the judicial predisposition towards indirect effect, as it involves a similar method as
that traditionally endorsed by Finnish courts in situations involving the granting of
judicial effect to constitutional and human rights.
Finally, it is to be noted that the primary authority of constitutional interpretation
and review in Finland – the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament – is not
considered a court or tribunal that is entitled to make a request for a preliminary
ruling by the CJEU. This signiﬁcantly hampers ex ante review by the Committee of
proposals for EU measures or their domestic implementing enactments for their
compatibility with the Constitution and human rights treaties, including the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, because such a review often requires a sufﬁcient
knowledge of the meaning of EU law. The inability of the Committee to make
preliminary ruling references also means that the Committee cannot engage in the
same kind of constitutional dialogue with the CJEU as the constitutional courts of
other Member States of the EU increasingly tend to have.
2.8.2–2.8.4 It is now submitted that the standard of judicial review by the EU courts
cannot, at least in general terms, be considered lower than that applied by Finnish
courts. Quite the contrary perhaps: it is to be emphasised that the traditional Finnish
position towards judicially protected rights was remarkably ‘distrustful’, and ‘re-
served’ until the late 1980s. Although Finland has had a written constitution with a
constitutional rights catalogue since 1919 and its human rights treaty ratiﬁcation
record can be considered excellent, constitutional and human rights and the judi-
ciary have assumed a rather marginal signiﬁcance on the Finnish scene of consti-
tutionalism. Instead, the country’s constitutional system has revolved around such
premises as the law as a supreme expression of the people’s will, as well as around
ideas about democracy as majority rule.90 The fundamental principle of legislative
supremacy was intensiﬁed by the statutory legal system, as well as by a positivist
conception of law.91 Finally, there was a rigid doctrine prohibiting judicial review
of legislation for its compatibility with the Constitution.92
Given these constitutional traditions, there was a lack of any genuine judicial
review based on constitutional or human rights in Finland before the 1990s. Instead,
the traditional approach was a general inclination towards the idea that the legis-
lature has the competence to deﬁne the actual content of rights, and that judicial
powers must be exercised in this pre-legislated and judicially self-restrained
90 See Nergelius 2006.
91 A difference can be detected between the Nordic countries in that while Scandinavian realism
remains the mainstream philosophy in the other Nordic countries, Finland maintains a more
traditional Kantian-Kelsenian normativist perspective of legal positivism. As a historical back-
ground to this, reference can be made to the successful legal positivist resistance by the Finnish
legal and political elite to campaigns of Russiﬁcation in the late 19th and early 20th century when
Finland was still an autonomous Grand-Duchy within the Russian Empire (until 1917). See also
Scheinin 2008.
92 See especially Lavapuro et al. 2011.
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framework. Indeed, there was hardly any room in the Finnish traditional thinking
for a ‘strict’ standard of judicial review.
It now goes almost without saying that EU membership, together with inter-
national human rights treaties with the ECHR at their apex, have propelled the
strong tendency towards rights-based constitutionalism since the late 1980s, with
the outcome that the overall constitutional setting today is characterised by the
peculiar combination of ex ante review by the Constitutional Law Committee of
Parliament and a less traditional but now important ex post review by the courts.93
While there may be some differences between the standard of review by the EU
courts and domestic constitutional actors at the level of individual cases, it is
submitted here that it is simply impossible to maintain that in general the domestic
standard is higher than that applied by the EU courts – or vice versa.
As noted already above, the judgment of the CJEU in the Digital Rights Ireland
case warranted the adoption of a new approach by the Constitutional Law
Committee of Parliament, as the Committee acknowledged that a rigid distinction
between ‘content’ and ‘metadata’ (information about the parties and about the
messages being sent and delivered between them) can no longer be treated as a
decisive and determining factor for the assessment of fundamental rights intrusions
due to surveillance (see Sect. 2.4).
2.9 Other Constitutional Rights and Principles
2.9.1 In Finland, the Constitution unequivocally requires that legal provisions on
the exercise of public power, as well as on the rights and obligations of individuals
or other private parties, must be laid down by an Act of Parliament. This premise is
indicated by a number of constitutional provisions, such as Sect. 80 and Sect. 95 of
the Constitution.94 It follows that all directives and other EU measures that regulate
the rights or duties of individuals and other private parties or that otherwise are of a
‘legislative nature’ must be implemented through an Act of Parliament.
Yet tension can be noted as regards the methods of implementation of EU
legislation where the method of incorporation through an Act of Parliament in
blanco has been used, instead of the method of transformation which is clearly the
most appropriate for the purpose of taking the requirements stemming from con-
stitutional rights and the Constitution in general into account appropriately, as this
method entails enacting domestic legislation in harmony with the EU measure in
93 Ojanen 2009a.
94 Section 80(1) provides that ‘[t]he principles governing the rights and obligations of individuals
and the other matters that under this Constitution are of a legislative nature shall be governed by
Acts of Parliament’. Section 95(1), in turn, provides that ‘[t]he provisions of treaties and other
international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by an
Act of Parliament.’ Several constitutional provisions on constitutional rights also require that more
detailed provisions on those rights be laid down by an Act of Parliament.
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question. The method of incorporation on the other hand simply entails a statement
in an Act of Parliament that a certain EU measure is in force domestically. Hence, it
invites problems insofar as ‘the quality of law’ is concerned (see also the discussion
in Sect. 2.3.6). The same can be said about the third major method of implemen-
tation of EU measures – reference, i.e. special clauses in domestic legislative
provisions which stipulate that a speciﬁed EU measure is to be taken into account in
the application of the Act in question. The Constitutional Law Committee of
Parliament has on several occasions emphasised that the method of transformation
should be preferred in the domestic implementation of EU legislation, especially in
cases in which EU legislation affects individual rights or imposes obligations on
individuals, or entails interferences with fundamental and human rights.
2.10 Common Constitutional Traditions
2.10.1–2.10.2 While there has been some scholarly discussion about the possible
signiﬁcance of the Finnish constitutional traditions, including constitutional iden-
tity, within the European context, this topic has yet to ﬁgure at the level of domestic
constitutional practice, as neither the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament
nor the Finnish courts have thus far articulated ‘Finnish constitutional traditions’ in
their practice.95
However, it should be emphasised that the Constitutional Law Committee of
Parliament could very well take advantage of arguments originating in domestic
constitutional traditions, including domestic constitutional identity, when express-
ing its views on the constitutionality of proposals for EU measures under Sect. 96 of
the Constitution. Similarly, Finnish courts could refer to the long-standing consti-
tutional traditions or idiosyncratic elements of the ‘Finnish constitutional identity’
when requesting a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the interpretation of EU
law or the validity of EU legislation. This has simply yet to be done.
2.11 Article 53 of the Charter and the Issue of Stricter
Constitutional Standards
2.11.1 As already noted, one of the concerns in Finland on the threshold of
Finland’s accession to the EU was that EU membership might erode the national
standard of protection of fundamental rights. Hence, some solutions of the 1995
Fundamental Rights Reform can be seen as attempts to protect certain constitutional
rights against opposite tendencies that EU membership might entail in the long
run.96 In 2001, the Constitutional Law Committee also went so far as to say that the
95 See Salminen 2014.
96 See e.g. Ojanen 2007, p. 157.
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domestic implementation of EU law was not permitted to weaken the domestic
standard of rights protection97 – a claim with readily obvious potential for conflict
with the primacy of EU law over all conflicting domestic law, especially in light of
the judgment by the CJEU in the Melloni case98.
To date, the Constitutional Law Committee has already issued a myriad of
Opinions on either proposals for EU measures or domestic implementing enact-
ments of regulations, directives and other EU instruments in light of the
Constitution and human rights obligations binding on Finland. It is possible to
identify the following major trends and patterns in the welter of details in these
Opinions.
The ﬁrst major observation to be made is that despite Finnish fears to the
contrary, EU membership has not posed any signiﬁcant threat to domestic funda-
mental rights. In a clear majority of situations, it has been possible to implement EU
law without having to fall short of the appropriate observance of fundamental and
human rights. In other words, the constitutional premise that the implementation of
EU measures may not weaken the protection of fundamental rights has so far very
seldom resulted in the following optimisation dilemma: an effort by the national
legislature or some other state organ to ensure the observance of fundamental rights
undermines the effective implementation and enforcement of EU law – or vice
versa. Indeed, it deserves to be emphasised that EU membership has actually
contributed to the protection of fundamental and human rights in Finland in the area
of several rights. Perhaps most noteworthy are the positive effects of EU law on the
principles of equality and non-discrimination, as well as fundamental environ-
mental rights.
The second major observation is that even if there has occasionally been a prima
facie tension between domestic fundamental rights and EU law, the practice of the
Constitutional Law Committee suggests an attempt to blunt the edge of any open
conflict between domestic fundamental rights and EU law in a variety of ways. To
start with, the Committee has avoided the reality of any open conflict by inter-
preting EU measures in a manner designed to meet the requirements stemming
from domestic fundamental rights.99 The imprecise and open-ended wording of EU
measures has often eased this task. Moreover, the Committee has increasingly taken
advantage of the premise that EU law itself generally ensures an effective protection
of fundamental rights and, moreover, demands that all areas of the EU legal order
must be interpreted in a manner sensitive to EU fundamental rights.100 Yet another
reason for the lack of tension between domestic fundamental rights and EU law has
been that the EU measures in question have often assumed the character of mini-
mum standard measures, i.e. they have only established the lowest common
denominator in their ﬁeld of application. Consequently, it has not been contrary to
97 Opinion 25/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
98 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] EU:C:2013:107.
99 Opinion 5/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
100 See e.g. Opinion 5/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
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EU law to grant more extensive protection to domestic fundamental rights under
national law.101 Finally, EU acts have most often been directives or framework
decisions, which usually allow a broader or stricter margin of discretion for the
Member States in their implementation.
Thirdly, it can be noted that there are a few situations involving the imple-
mentation of EU law in which the observance of fundamental and human rights has
compromised the ‘maximal’ implementation of EU law. Aside from the imple-
mentation of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision discussed above,
reference can be made to the domestic implementation of the Council Framework
Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.102 However, these situations
have clearly been very rare exceptions to the rule which is simply that EU mem-
bership has not brought about any signiﬁcant erosion of the domestic protection of
fundamental and human rights.
Finally, it should be noted that the whole domestic thinking about ‘stricter
constitutional standards’ has proved to be more self-sufﬁcient and self-satisﬁed
Finnish thinking than something reflecting the reality of Finnish legal practice. In
Finland, the meaning of rights and, accordingly, the standard of protection is still
very much dependent on majoritarian notions of democracy, formal notions of legal
certainly and other similar factors that combine to cause what can be called a
‘minimalist approach’ to constitutional and human rights. Although the ECHR and
other human rights treaties should feature ‘only’ as a minimum standard of rights
protection, both the Constitutional Law Committee and the Finnish courts are far
too often satisﬁed with the standard of protection under the ECHR, as indicated by
the existing case law of the ECtHR. Hence, the problem is not only ‘a race to the
bottom’, i.e. to the lowest common denominator of rights protection, but also the
disregard of other human rights treaties beyond the ECHR.103
2.12 Democratic Debate on Constitutional Rights
and Values
2.12.1 In principle, the Finnish system of abstract ex ante constitutional review by
the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament provides a good framework for
democratic – or, perhaps more to the point, parliamentary – debate on constitutional
rights and values in the context of European integration. Up until now, however, the
most signiﬁcant democratic debates on constitutional rights and values or funda-
mental constitutional principles in general have not taken place within the context
101 See e.g. Opinions 1/2001 and 11/2001 of the Constitutional Law Committee.
102 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, [2002]
OJ L 164/3.
103 For a minimalist approach to constitutional and human rights, see especially Lavapuro et al.
2011, especially pp. 518–529.
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of the implementation of the EAW Framework Decision or the EU Data Retention
Directive, although there has been some discussion and debate in Parliament and
elsewhere in Finnish civil society on these two topics. Instead, the most noteworthy
democratic debates have related to the constitutionality of various measures, pro-
grammes and other instruments pertaining to the so-called euro crisis. As was
already noted above in Sect. 2.7, Finland and particularly its Constitutional Law
Committee were actually the forerunners in calling attention to various constitu-
tional questions pertaining to the ESM Treaty and other instruments, and already at
the time when these instruments were still at their draft stages.
2.12.2–2.12.3 The authors of this report are of the view that if a certain EU measure
has raised serious constitutional questions in a number of constitutional courts or
with similar domestic constitutional actors, this might very well warrant the interim
suspension of the application of such measure until its validity has been resolved.
Similarly, it is at least thinkable that the unconstitutionality of a certain EU measure
might feature as a defensive argument in infringement proceedings against a
Member State, although the admissibility of this argument would eventually be up
to the CJEU to decide in light of the EU legal order as a whole, including the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
2.13 Experts’ Analysis on the Protection of Constitutional
Rights in EU Law
2.13.1 The Experts cannot share the concern about an overall reduction in the
standard of protection of constitutional rights and the rule of law in the context of
EU law. A reference is made here to what has been observed about the effects of EU
membership on the domestic system for the protection of constitutional rights and
human rights throughout Part 2 of the report. However, this is not to deny that there
have been some situations in which EU law has fallen below the domestic standard
of protection. Moreover, the implementation of EU law has sometimes compro-
mised the ‘quality of law’ which is one important dimension of the rule of law
principle and fundamental and human rights protection.
Overall, therefore, the reduction of the domestic standard of rights protection and
the rule of law principle by EU membership can be described as ‘low’ and ‘limited’.
3 Constitutional Issues in Global Governance
3.1 Constitutional Rules on International Organisations
and the Ratiﬁcation of Treaties
3.1.1 The Constitution of Finland does not include any speciﬁc rules on interna-
tional organisations beyond the EU and the general internationalisation clause,
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‘Finland participates in international co-operation for the protection of peace and
human rights and for the development of society’ (Sect. 1(3)), as was already noted
in Part 1 of this report.
3.1.2 For the background of the above-mentioned internationalisation clause, see
Sects. 1.2.1 and 1.5.3.
3.2 The Position of International Law in National Law
3.2.1–3.2.2 As a matter of domestic constitutional law, the hierarchical status of the
domestic incorporating Act of an international treaty determines the form and rank
of the treaty provisions in the domestic legal order. As international treaties are
brought into force domestically either through an Act of Parliament in blanco or
through a similar government decree, it follows that the formal status of an inter-
national treaty assumes either the hierarchical rank of an Act of Parliament or a
government decree. Moreover, the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament has
emphasised that the method of incorporation warrants the direct application of
international treaties by the domestic courts and authorities.104
Insofar as the issue of ratiﬁcation and implementation of treaties under inter-
national law, including the founding treaties of the EU, are concerned, in the
Constitution of Finland, the relationship between Finnish law and international law
has traditionally been understood as representing the dualist approach. Therefore,
no international treaty can be part of Finnish law solely by virtue of its acceptance
by Parliament. A distinct domestic legal enactment is also required for the purpose
of making any particular international treaty part of the Finnish legal order. The
‘dualist approach’ is clearly indicated by Sects. 94 and 95 of the Constitution,
which distinguish between ‘Acceptance of international obligations and their
denouncement’ (Sect. 94) and ‘Bringing into force of international obligations’
(Sect. 95). However, as the predominant method of implementing international
treaties in Finland is incorporation either through an Act of Parliament in blanco or
through a similar government decree, the Finnish constitutional position towards
international treaties represents dualism formally, but monism in practice.
It also deserves emphasis that international human rights treaties are a special
case among international treaties in the domestic constitutional setting,105 as they
assume what might be called semi-constitutional status. This feature is the outcome
of the following four factors: (i) several constitutional provisions explicitly refer to
both domestic constitutional rights and international human rights; (ii) the method
of incorporation warrants their direct applicability by domestic courts and author-
ities; (iii) courts and authorities are obliged to interpret all domestic law, including
104 See e.g. Opinion 2/1990 of the Constitutional Law Committee on the direct applicability of the
ECHR due to the method of incorporation.
105 See Scheinin 1996, pp. 259–260.
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constitutional provisions on constitutional rights in a ‘human rights-oriented’ way;
and (iv) the status of international human rights treaties as a minimum standard of
domestic rights protection.
3.3 Democratic Control
3.3.1 In the Finnish system, Parliament is involved in the negotiation, acceptance
and incorporation of treaties according to the same sets of rules as already explained
in Part 1. As to the acceptance and incorporation of treaties, Sect. 94 and Sect. 95 of
the Constitution apply. Although the Government has a major role in international
affairs alongside the President, depending on the content of the treaty, Parliament
has competence to accept and incorporate treaties. In the negotiation phase,
Sect. 97 is relevant from the point of view of Parliament and democratic control. It
should be noted, however, that Sect. 96 provides Parliament better means for
controlling the Government’s actions. Thus, in many cases it is important to discuss
whether the international treaty in question, despite having the form of an inter-
national treaty, is de facto an EU affair. In practice, the division between Sects.
96 and 97 has become indistinct.
The European Stability Mechanism provides an excellent example of this. This
applies to scrutiny beyond its ratiﬁcation as well. Through the interpretations of
participation and information rights, Parliament is involved in the functioning of the
mechanism.
3.3.2 Only EU accession has been subject to a referendum. Sometimes, in political
discussions, NATO accession is mentioned as one possible case for a referendum.
Typically, the legitimacy of this kind of decision is mentioned as the rationale for a
referendum. As already mentioned above, the Constitution allows for such refer-
endums, but they are not constitutionally required.
3.4 Judicial Review
3.4.1 See Sects. 2.1 and 2.8.
3.5 The Social Welfare Dimension of the Constitution
3.5.1 The Constitution of Finland includes several rights which are a basis for the
social welfare dimension of the Constitution, and international human rights treaties
also have a role in this aspect.
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Nevertheless, the privatisation of public services for example has been rather
quick and most certainly affects the welfare dimension of the Constitution.
Delegation of public powers has occurred at all levels of the administration,
especially at the local level. Section 124 of the Constitution of Finland provides the
speciﬁc constitutional context for the limitations on privatisation. According to
Sect. 124,
[a] public administrative task may be delegated to others than public authorities only by an
Act or by virtue of an Act, if this is necessary for the appropriate performance of the task
and if basic rights and liberties, legal remedies and other requirements of good governance
are not endangered. However, a task involving signiﬁcant exercise of public powers can
only be delegated to public authorities.
In Finland, global governance has not been a major or direct cause of the
possible weakening of the welfare state or the erosion of the social elements of the
society, rather this has been caused by domestic politics which are of course highly
dependent on European and international tendencies.
3.6 Constitutional Rights and Values in Selected Areas
of Global Governance
3.6.1 In Finland, there has been some domestic discussion and debate about the
possible negative impact of the investment protection regime under the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which is currently being
negotiated between the European Union and the United States. In essence, the
worry has been that the planned investment protection regime could transfer powers
from the EU, domestic legislators and other public authorities to an arbitration body
with the outcome that this could inhibit Finland from adopting stricter legislative
measures in such areas as environmental and consumer protection, social policy and
employment. Also, the democratic legitimacy of the planned investment protection
regime has come into question.106
106 See also Opinion 1/2014 of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Opinion 1/2014 of the Grand
Committee where attention is called to the need to secure that the planned investment protection
regime would not prevent Finland from adopting new legislation in the areas of consumer pro-
tection, environmental protection and employment. The distinguished Finnish legal scholar
Professor Martti Koskenniemi has also cautioned in several interviews and public speeches that the
free trade pact could allow companies investing in Finland to launch legal action due to restrictions
laid out in Finnish legislation. See e.g. (2013, December 15). Professor: Finland’s legislative
power may be in jeopardy. Helsinki Times. http://www.helsinkitimes.ﬁ/ﬁnland/ﬁnland-news/
domestic/8717-professor-ﬁnland-s-legislative-power-may-be-in.
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